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The Hon Bruce Atkinson MLC The Hon Telmo Languiller MP 
President Speaker 
Legislative Council Legislative Assembly 
Parliament House Parliament House 
Melbourne Melbourne 
 
 
Dear Presiding Officers 
Under the provisions of section 16AB of the Audit Act 1994, I transmit my report on the 
audit Operational Effectiveness of the myki Ticketing System.  
The audit examined the operational effectiveness of the myki ticketing system. It assessed 
whether the arrangements in place for the system’s implementation and ongoing 
management are effective and whether the expected outcomes and benefits from the 
introduction of myki for users, operators and the state have been, or are on track to being, 
achieved. 
I found that the myki system has experienced significant delays in implementation and cost 
increases, largely as a result of deficiencies in the original governance, project planning 
and contractual arrangements. This has resulted in a poor outcome for Victoria’s public 
transport system and users, which has compromised achievement of myki’s original 
business case objectives and related benefits. 
Since its creation in 2012, Public Transport Victoria has improved oversight and 
management of the myki contractor, however, significant risks to the state remain due to 
weaknesses with the contract’s performance regime and the compressed time frames for 
the myki retender.  
Public Transport Victoria needs to urgently address these issues to avoid perpetuating past 
mistakes. 
Yours faithfully 
 
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
10 June 2015 
  
  
 
 Victorian Auditor-General’s Report Operational Effectiveness of the myki Ticketing System    v 
Contents 
Auditor-General's comments .................................................................... vii 
Audit summary .......................................................................................... ix 
 Background .............................................................................................................. ix 
Conclusions ............................................................................................................. x 
Findings ................................................................................................................... xi 
Recommendations .................................................................................................. xv 
Submissions and comments received .................................................................... xv 
1. Background .......................................................................................... 1 
 1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Overview of myki ............................................................................................. 1 
1.3 Reviews of public transport ticketing ............................................................... 7 
1.4 Institutional arrangements and responsibilities ............................................... 8 
1.5 Audit objective and scope ............................................................................... 9 
1.6 Audit method and cost ................................................................................... 10 
1.7 Structure of the report ................................................................................... 10 
2. Governance and contractual arrangements ......................................... 11 
 2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 12 
2.2 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 12 
2.3 Governance arrangements supporting the delivery and operation of 
myki ............................................................................................................... 13 
2.4 Contractual arrangements for myki ............................................................... 16 
3. Performance monitoring and benefits realisation .................................. 21 
 3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 22 
3.2 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 22 
3.3 Measuring myki's performance ..................................................................... 23 
3.4 Monitoring of myki's performance ................................................................. 28 
3.5 Snapshot of myki's operational performance ................................................ 30 
3.6 Complaints about myki .................................................................................. 33 
3.7 Benefit realisation and value for money ........................................................ 36 
Contents 
vi   Operational Effectiveness of the myki Ticketing System Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
4. Ticketing services retender .................................................................. 45 
 4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 46 
4.2 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 46 
4.3 Procurement planning ................................................................................... 46 
4.4 Governance arrangements ............................................................................ 50 
4.5 Lessons learned ............................................................................................ 51 
Appendix A. Regional myki use ................................................................ 53 
Appendix B. Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments ...... 55 
 
 Victorian Auditor-General’s Report Operational Effectiveness of the myki Ticketing System    vii 
Auditor-General’s comments 
A well designed and implemented ticketing system is crucial for the effective and 
efficient functioning of Victoria's public transport system. It enables commuters to 
easily access services, and provides important usage information for agencies to 
plan and manage the system effectively. 
In 2005, the state committed almost $1 billion to develop myki by 2007 to replace the 
ageing Metcard system, and operate myki for 10 years. It justified the investment on the 
premise that myki would deliver significant benefits to Victorians including more 
efficient, attractive and reliable transport services, and because it was the best value 
solution at the lowest whole-of-life cost. Public Transport Victoria (PTV) is currently 
planning to retender the contract for myki's continued operation which expires in 2016. 
In this audit, I examined myki's operational effectiveness, and whether the outcomes 
and benefits expected from its introduction are being achieved. I found that myki 
experienced significant delays and related cost increases that have compromised 
achievement of its original business case objectives and benefits. 
The time taken to develop and implement myki more than quadrupled from the initial 
expectation of two years, to in excess of nine years. Consequently, the state has 
incurred significant, additional unanticipated costs with myki's budget increasing by 
around $550 million, or 55 per cent.  
Poor initial planning resulted in myki's original scope and contract being vaguely 
specified and overly ambitious. This produced significant delivery risks that were 
poorly managed because of shortcomings in the state's initial governance and 
oversight of the project. 
While PTV has since improved oversight of the myki contractor and related 
contractual arrangements, significant risks to the state remain. Specifically: 
• PTV does not yet possess a complete and reliable picture of myki’s operational 
performance, due to shortcomings in performance monitoring 
• the benefits and outcomes sought from the myki retender have not been clearly 
defined 
• none of the agencies responsible for myki have assessed if it has achieved any 
of its expected benefits—despite previous commitments to the Public Accounts 
and Estimates Committee in 2012 that this would occur 
• compressed time frames for the myki retender risk exposing the state to 
significant additional costs. 
PTV needs to urgently address these issues and assess the residual benefits 
achievable from myki going forward, to optimise value from the state's significant and 
ongoing expenditure. However, I am concerned that current Cabinet-in-confidence 
conventions pose a barrier to this work. These prevent agencies from accessing the 
full business case for myki needed to conduct a benefits review, and for all other 
current and major state investments that were approved by former governments. 
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
Audit team 
Steven Vlahos 
Engagement Leader 
Tony Brown 
Acting Engagement 
Leader 
Rocco Rottura 
Team Leader 
Hayley Svenson 
Analyst 
Engagement Quality 
Control Reviewer 
Dallas Mischkulnig 
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This is impeding the effective governance of both myki, and all other major 
investments by the state in projects whose life cycle usually extends beyond the term 
of Parliament and any government. It is also compromising the effectiveness of the 
state's Gateway Review and High Value High Risk framework. 
I note that in 2012 the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) wrote to the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet—the custodian of these conventions—
recommending that they be amended to exempt full business cases for all major 
projects approved by Cabinet. However, this has yet to be resolved. 
It is nevertheless encouraging that the government recently dispensed with these 
conventions to release the full East West Link business case in the public interest. 
There is a need to extend this practice to all business cases for major state 
investments approved by current and former governments. 
Urgent action is required to address this issue as it risks reducing the role of any 
business case to simply being a hoop that agencies must jump through to get the 
initial approval, which can then be disregarded following a change of government. It 
also heightens the risk, particularly in the case of myki, of history repeating itself. 
The challenges identified by my audit are longstanding and reflect recurring issues 
previously highlighted by successive audits of public transport and related ticketing 
systems undertaken by my office. 
Our 1990 audit Met Ticket, and 1998 audit Automating Fare Collection: a major 
initiative in public transport, both found that fast tracking the development of ticketing 
systems led to poor planning, successive delays and blowouts in implementation 
which exposed the state to significant cost.  
Additionally, my 2014 audit Coordinating Public Transport and 2015 audit Tendering 
Metropolitan Bus Contracts found recurring shortcomings in performance data and 
related monitoring activities, which offer little assurance the state is achieving 
adequate value from these services. 
I made five recommendations which reinforce the need for PTV to strengthen its 
monitoring of myki prior to awarding the new contract. I have also recommended that 
central agencies advise the government on the impact of current constraints to 
accessing full business cases posed by existing Cabinet conventions.  
I intend to monitor implementation of these recommendations. 
I wish to thank the staff at PTV, the Department of Economic Development, Jobs, 
Transport & Resources and DTF for their constructive engagement throughout the 
audit process. 
 
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
June 2015 
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Audit summary 
Background 
In July 2005, the state entered into a contract to develop myki, a smartcard public 
transport ticketing system to replace the ageing Metcard system. 
Just over half of myki's almost $1 billion initial budget—around $520 million—was 
for establishing the system by 2007 and operating it for 10 years. The remainder 
was for operating Metcard in parallel with myki during the transition, and to cover 
the former Transport Ticketing Authority's (TTA) related costs for managing 
Metcard and its replacement.  
Metcard was switched off in December 2012 following the completion of myki's 
rollout across metropolitan services. Public Transport Victoria (PTV) has since 
assumed responsibility for all of TTA's related functions and finalised myki's rollout 
across selected regional services in February 2014. 
It was expected that myki would deliver around $6.3–$10.8 million per year in 
economic benefits to the state and its objectives included: 
• enhancing the community's image of public transport 
• providing the best value-for-money solution at the lowest whole-of-life cost 
• being operational at, or shortly after, Metcard's expiry in 2007. 
However, there have been significant implementation issues with the system. 
Specifically, the time taken to design and deliver it more than quadrupled from the 
original expectation of just two years, to in excess of nine years. This has led to 
significant unanticipated additional costs—resulting in a $550 million, or 
55 per cent, increase on the project's original budget. 
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The operational performance of myki has also attracted significant complaints and 
criticism from users. In particular, overcharging has been, by far, the single most 
common complaint from users about myki since its rollout. 
In response to these challenges, the former government commissioned a review of 
myki in late 2010 to determine its future. It decided to proceed with implementing 
myki, but with modifications. The resulting changes substantially reduced myki's 
initial scope, further extended its delivery time frames, and fundamentally changed 
the way the state pays for the system. 
The current myki contract is due to expire in June 2016, with an option to extend it 
for a further six months to December 2016. PTV is currently planning the myki 
retender, which it expects to complete by November 2016. 
Objectives of the audit 
The audit examined the operational effectiveness of the myki ticketing system. It 
assessed whether the arrangements in place for the system’s implementation and 
ongoing management are effective and whether the expected outcomes and 
benefits from the introduction of myki for users, operators and the state have been, 
or are on track to being, achieved. 
Conclusions 
The implementation of myki experienced significant delays and related cost 
increases, due largely to deficiencies in the original contract and governance 
arrangements.  
This has resulted in a poor outcome for Victoria’s public transport system and 
users, which has compromised achievement of myki’s original business case 
objectives and related benefits.  
The overly ambitious and vaguely specified initial project scope and contract for 
myki contributed to this outcome.  
These deficiencies meant the state was not in a position to assure it was paying for 
a ticketing system that met clearly articulated and agreed performance standards—
particularly during the initial build and rollout.  
Shortcomings in both cross-agency coordination and oversight of the initial project 
conspired with these issues to produce significant delivery risks that were not well 
managed. Collectively, these challenges undermined the viability of the original 
contract.  
PTV has since improved its oversight and management of the myki contractor by 
strengthening related governance and contractual arrangements.  
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However, significant risks to the state remain. Specifically: 
• PTV does not yet possess a complete and reliable picture of myki’s 
operational performance due to weaknesses with the contract’s new 
performance regime and its implementation 
• the benefits and outcomes sought from the myki retender have not been 
clearly defined, which reduces transparency and accountability for myki’s 
future performance 
• compressed time frames for the myki retender, caused by previous delays 
and the imminent expiration of the current contract, risk exposing the state to 
significant additional costs. 
PTV needs to urgently address these issues to avoid perpetuating previous 
mistakes, and to ensure that the state can maximise value from the future 
operation of myki. 
Findings 
Governance and contractual arrangements 
The original myki governance arrangements were previously examined by: 
• the Victorian Ombudsman's 2011 Own motion investigation into ICT-enabled 
projects jointly conducted with VAGO  
• the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee's 2012 Inquiry into Effective 
Decision Making for the Successful Delivery Of Significant Infrastructure 
Projects 
• related internal reviews undertaken by the Department of Treasury and 
Finance in 2011 and 2014. 
These reviews consistently found that the roles and responsibilities of key agencies 
initially charged with myki's development were neither well defined nor effectively 
implemented. This led to uncertainty and delays in decision-making, particularly 
during myki's initial build and rollout.  
Critical weaknesses highlighted by these reviews include: 
• a lack of clarity regarding whether the former Department of Transport (DOT) 
or TTA was the ultimate decision-maker on myki matters 
• ineffective communication between DOT and TTA impeded TTA's 
implementation of DOT's ticketing policies and TTA's capacity to meet 
prescribed deadlines 
• poor engagement between the myki contractor and public transport operators  
• TTA did not possess the capacity and capability needed to effectively manage 
the project. 
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xii   Operational Effectiveness of the myki Ticketing System Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
In combination with myki's ambitious initial scale and poorly defined functional 
performance requirements, these issues contributed to significant delays in 
implementing the new ticketing system and compromised the viability of myki's 
initial contract. This precipitated six major contractual amendments as the project 
encountered significant difficulties. 
These amendments strengthened the contract's viability but at the cost of 
substantially reducing myki's scope, increasing its total cost to the state, and 
extending its delivery time frames by a further seven years. Collectively these 
issues have compromised the achievement of myki's originally intended benefits. 
PTV's establishment in April 2012, as the new authority responsible for managing 
myki and Victoria’s public transport system, has led to improvements in the 
governance and contractual arrangements in place for myki. 
This has resolved the previous disconnect in responsibilities for public transport 
ticketing policy development and implementation that hampered TTA's 
management of myki. The new arrangements have also clarified PTV's role, 
decision-making authority and accountability for managing the myki contractor. 
Monitoring myki's operational performance 
The performance regime in the initial myki contract was complex, onerous and, 
with 81 measures, difficult to apply in practice. Further, the performance measures 
only applied once myki was fully operational. 
The Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) raised concerns with the initial 
performance regime in successive briefings to the former Treasurer in 2012 and 
2013 noting that the performance measures were 'difficult to interpret and apply' 
and that a new regime was needed to drive 'appropriate behaviours' from the 
contractor. 
PTV subsequently developed a new performance regime which it implemented in 
April 2013. The new regime has: 
• introduced incentives for the contractor to promptly address faults with myki 
devices and related software upgrades that previously disrupted system 
operations 
• increased the contractor's focus on assuring the accuracy of financial 
information recorded by the system. 
However, fundamental issues remain. Specifically:  
• current measures in the contract's new performance regime do not address 
all key aspects of performance  
• there is no framework for assessing myki's overall effectiveness, efficiency 
and benefits  
• PTV does not adequately assure the reliability of results, reported by the 
contractor, that underpin incentive payments.  
Audit summary 
Victorian Auditor-General’s Report  Operational Effectiveness of the myki Ticketing System    xiii 
PTV needs to urgently address these issues as they are impacting on the 
effectiveness and integrity of the performance regime. 
Despite PTV not being able to adequately assure the reliability of the contractor's 
performance data, it has paid $1.4 million in performance-linked incentives and has 
applied abatements totalling $325 000, between April 2013 and December 2014.  
Assessing the achievement of myki's benefits 
None of the agencies responsible for myki have assessed whether it has achieved 
any of its expected outcomes and benefits, including providing value for money.  
Consequently, there is no evidence myki has satisfactorily achieved any of its 
original business case objectives.  
In 2012, DOT, TTA and DTF advised the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee 
that a review assessing the extent to which myki's benefits have been realised 
would be undertaken following the completion of its rollout. This has not yet 
occurred. 
While DTF subsequently prepared a 'lessons learnt review' in 2014 which identified 
valuable insights into the issues affecting myki's delivery, including the 
appropriateness of governance and contractual arrangements, the review did not 
assess whether any benefits had been achieved. 
Instead DTF sought, and received, an exemption from the former Treasurer in 2013 
from performing the benefits review required by the Gateway Review process. It 
justified this on the grounds that the business case had not been updated since the 
project was first approved, and because it was unable to access it, given it was a 
Cabinet document of the former government. 
This advice was deficient. While DTF correctly noted the constraint to accessing 
the business case posed by existing Cabinet conventions, it did not advise the 
Treasurer that this impedes: 
• the effective governance of myki, and of all major state investments requiring 
a full business case to be approved by Cabinet 
• DTF's oversight of these projects under the High Value High Risk framework. 
Urgent action is required to address this issue as this risks diminishing the value 
and role of a business case. It reduces it to simply being a hoop agencies jump 
through to get the initial approval, which they can then disregard following any 
change of government. 
The original business case committed almost $1 billion of taxpayer funds on the 
premise that myki would deliver significant benefits to Victorians. It is therefore 
critical that PTV and DTF assess the benefits achieved to understand the nature 
and extent of any benefits that remain achievable going forward. This will help 
assure full accountability for and transparency of the achievements from this 
significant expenditure of taxpayer funds. 
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While the current time lines may mean that it will be difficult to undertake a 
post-implementation review against the business case in time to inform the 
retender, such a review would provide PTV with important insights on the actions it 
should take to optimise achievement of benefits in the current retender and next 
iteration of myki.  
Notwithstanding, as noted earlier, the substantial reduction in myki's scope over 
time, coupled with significant increases in the original project time line and budget, 
mean that it is almost certain that myki has failed to satisfactorily achieve its 
original business case objectives and assumed benefits. 
Planning for the myki retender 
The myki retender is occurring under significant time pressure due, in part, to 
previous delays in implementing myki. 
These delays have forced PTV to commit to exercising its option to extend the 
current contract for a further six months to December 2016 in order to 
accommodate the retender evaluation and transition period. This has virtually 
eliminated any contingency in the retender schedule. 
Consequently, there is a significant risk that the tender outcome will not be finalised 
before the current contractual term expires. If this occurs, it may seriously worsen 
the state's negotiating position and expose it to significant additional costs. 
The current contract provides no option for further extensions. This means there is 
no certainty that this can feasibly occur. Any significant extension of the transition 
and handover period beyond December 2016, if a new contractor is appointed, is 
likely to require extensive negotiations with the incumbent operator and substantial 
additional funds to cover unanticipated costs. 
PTV is taking steps to mitigate the risk of this occurring and, in so doing, is 
considering the relevant lessons from the previous myki contract. However, to 
achieve this PTV needs to effectively manage the retender and related schedule.  
PTV is yet to clearly define the expected outcomes and benefits from the retender 
process and the new contract. This reduces the transparency of the new contract's 
impact, and accountability for PTV's related performance. 
PTV needs to address this issue as a matter of urgency as it has the potential, yet 
again, to compromise the achievement of planned outcomes from this critical 
system. 
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Recommendations 
Number Recommendation Page 
That Public Transport Victoria:  
1. strengthens its performance monitoring arrangements for 
myki prior to awarding the new contract by: 
• assessing the adequacy of existing performance 
measures and standards for driving improvements in 
performance  
• developing new measures addressing how well the 
equipment operates as distinct from the length of time for 
which it is available 
• reviewing on at least an annual basis and, where 
necessary, adjusting performance incentives to support 
further improvements in performance or achievement of 
emerging service priorities 
• developing a broader framework to assess myki’s 
efficiency and effectiveness and its impact on improving 
performance and management of the public transport 
system 
43 
2. uses its right under the contract to audit and verify the 
performance data provided by the contractor 
43 
3. seek access to the original myki business case in 
consultation with the Department of Premier and Cabinet 
and: 
• conduct a post-implementation review of the myki project 
against its original objectives and benefits 
• incorporate relevant lessons into the new myki contract 
as soon as possible and in any future subsequent 
procurement of public transport ticketing services. 
43 
That the Department of Treasury and Finance coordinate with the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet to: 
 
4. advise the government on the impacts of current Cabinet 
conventions on the Gateway Review and High Value High 
Risk framework and related benefits reviews. 
43 
That Public Transport Victoria:  
5. clarifies the retender benefits and intended outcomes and 
develops measurable associated indicators. 
52 
Submissions and comments received 
We have professionally engaged with Public Transport Victoria, the Department of 
Treasury and Finance, and the Department of Economic Development, Jobs, 
Transport & Resources throughout the course of the audit. In accordance with 
section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 we provided a copy of this report to those 
agencies and requested their submissions or comments. 
We have considered those views in reaching our audit conclusions and have 
represented them to the extent relevant and warranted. Their full section 16(3) 
submissions and comments are included in Appendix B.  
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1 Background
1.1 Introduction 
Public transport ticketing systems 
Modern public transport ticketing systems are much more than simply fare collection 
tools. They provide the key interface with customers and, with smartcard technology, 
can assist strategic planning for the public transport system, through the collection of 
valuable usage data. A well designed and implemented system should be easy for 
commuters to use, and benefit transport operators by streamlining fare collection and 
providing access to important data on travel behaviour. 
Smartcard systems are the new standard in transport ticketing internationally due to 
their convenience and efficiency. Tickets can be purchased and ‘topped up’ using 
automated processes, they allow rapid movement through stations and easy 
interchange between different travel modes.  
However, international experience has also shown that developing reliable and 
effective public transport ticketing systems is both difficult and expensive.  
1.2 Overview of myki  
In Victoria, public transport ticketing depends on which service a passenger uses:  
 myki for metropolitan trains, trams and buses, V/Line commuter trains and some 
regional town buses—Appendix A in this report contains a map showing the 
regional train and coach network and a list of regional town bus networks 
included in the myki ticketing system 
 paper tickets for V/Line coach and long distance train services 
 paper tickets for some regional town buses. 
 
myki smartcard 
Background 
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In July 2005, the state entered into a contract to develop a smartcard public transport 
ticketing system, known as myki, to replace the former Metcard system, which expired 
in 2007. 
Under the terms of the original contract, myki was to be fully operational by July 2007. 
The initial whole-of-project budget was $998.9 million and included $177.1 million for 
delivering myki and $345.5 million for operating it for 10 years. The remaining budget 
included funds for operating the Metcard system in parallel with myki during the 
transition, and related operating costs for the former Transport Ticketing Authority 
(TTA). TTA was established in 2003 to manage Metcard, and the procurement and 
rollout of the new ticketing system, now known as myki. TTA was abolished in 2013 
following the establishment of Public Transport Victoria (PTV) which has since 
assumed responsibility for all of TTA's functions. 
The myki system includes the following components: 
 myki smartcard—used to pay for travel on public transport. The myki smartcard 
technology enables a money value—myki money—and/or a travel pass—myki 
pass—to be stored on the card. Public transport users that ‘top up’ with myki 
money need to touch on and off for each trip so that the myki system can 
automatically calculate and deduct the lowest fare for the travel taken.  
 Devices—the system currently has around 23 500 operational devices. These 
include card vending and top-up machines, fare payment devices, bus and tram 
driver consoles, station gates and hand-held devices. These devices read and 
translate information stored on smartcards and transmit information to and from 
the back office. 
 The back office and related systems—these support the operation of the myki 
system. 
 
Card vending and top‐up machine 
Background 
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It was expected that myki would deliver a range of benefits for users, transport 
operators and the state including: 
 ease of use   
 convenient purchase and payment options  
 efficient operations in terms of boarding  
 high-quality information for transport planning  
 increased flexibility to change and drive user patterns through differential pricing 
and fare structures. 
myki is an open-architecture system, meaning it allows the flexibility of adding, 
upgrading and swapping components over time without limiting the state to using a 
single vendor. 
1.2.1 Implementation of myki system 
Despite their clear benefits for commuters and transport system operators, smartcard 
ticketing systems are challenging to design and implement due to: 
 the complexity involved in designing and delivering a solution that meets the 
needs of a unique transport system, such as Victoria's, with multiple modes and 
zones of travel 
 the need to properly inform and assist commuters as they adapt to the new 
system. 
There are few examples of the ambitious approach taken in Victoria, which sought to 
introduce a statewide smartcard ticketing system across all public transport modes and 
zones. The Department of Treasury and Finance’s (DTF) 2011 Project review of the 
myki ticketing system noted that most smartcard ticketing systems were initially 
introduced in the metropolitan area only—as in Perth, London, Hong Kong and 
Singapore—or a metropolitan area plus adjacent region—as in South East 
Queensland. There are considerable challenges in bringing together a range of 
different fares across metropolitan, regional and rural areas, different public transport 
operators, and various types of customers. 
Figure 1A compares myki to other smartcard systems operating in Perth, South East 
Queensland, and London by initial scope and key functions. It shows that myki is the 
only smartcard ticketing system that was initially integrated across metropolitan and 
regional areas, and possessed a wider range of functions than the ticketing systems in 
other jurisdictions.     
Background 
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  Figure 1A
Ticketing system comparisons 
 
Victoria's  
myki 
South East 
Queensland's 
go card 
Perth's 
SmartRider 
London's  
Oyster card 
Scope     
Devices 20 000  8 000 4 000 25 000 
Metropolitan 
transport modes 
• Bus 
• Train 
• Tram 
 
• Bus 
• Train  
• Tram 
• Ferry 
 
• Bus 
• Train  
• Ferry 
• Bus 
• Train—
Underground 
and 
Overground 
• Docklands 
Light Railway 
• Trams 
• River boat 
• National Rail 
within London 
Regional 
transport modes 
• Commuter 
trains 
• Regional 
town buses 
   
Key functions 
Time-based     
Zone-based     
Auto top up     
Online top up     
Pass and money     
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on the Project Review of the myki ticketing 
system, February 2011, Department of Treasury and Finance. 
The myki system covers: 
• 15 train lines with 208 stations in metropolitan Melbourne 
• 24 tram routes with 500 trams in metropolitan Melbourne 
• 346 bus routes with 1 753 buses in metropolitan Melbourne 
• 5 regional train lines with 51 stations  
• 127 regional bus routes.  
The myki system also offers a complex range of ticketing fares, with both zoned and 
time-based charging and a variety of concessions and discounts. The system executes 
150 business rules each time a card is scanned, which constitutes around 1.07 million 
fare transaction‑type permutations, making it one of the most complex smartcard 
ticketing solutions in the world. 
As at December 2014, more than 13.4 million myki cards had been issued with the 
system processing around 7.8 million 'touch on' transactions per week from 9.9 million 
active cards. In 2013–14 the total farebox collected by myki across all transport modes 
was around $800 million.  
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1.2.2 Implementation of myki 
Time line in implementing myki 
The myki system was due to be operational by July 2007. However, there have been 
multiple delays, scope changes and cost increases. Figure 1B illustrates these delays. 
  Figure 1B
Delays in implementing myki 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
Initially myki was implemented on regional buses in Geelong in December 2008. The 
system was extended to bus services in five other regional centres from March 2009. It 
began running on metropolitan trains in December 2009, and was extended to 
metropolitan trams and buses in July 2010. In December 2012, myki became the only 
form of ticket valid on Melbourne public transport and the previous ticketing system, 
Metcard, was switched off. In February 2014, myki replaced paper tickets on V/Line 
services across selected services in Victoria. 
The total time of the design and delivery phase has more than quadrupled from the 
original expectation of two years, to in excess of nine years. This is more consistent 
with smartcard projects in other cities, where it usually takes five or more years. 
Figure 1C illustrates the time taken to implement public transport ticketing systems in 
other jurisdictions.    
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  Figure 1C
Delivery time frames for public transport ticketing systems 
Region Card name Delivery time frame 
Hong Kong Octopus 3 years 
Perth SmartRider 4 years 
South East Queensland go card 5 years 
Los Angeles TAP 5-plus years 
Houston Q-Card 5-plus years 
Minneapolis Go-to-card 5-plus years 
Ireland ITS 5-plus years 
London Oyster 6 years 
Holland OV-Chipkaart 7-plus years 
Victoria myki 9 years 
Paris Navigo 10-plus years 
San Francisco Translink/Clipper 12-plus years 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on the Victorian Government submission to the 
Legislative Council Select Committee on Train Services, former Department of Transport. 
Cost 
At 30 June 2014, the revised capital and operating budget for myki until 2016 was 
$1 550.5 million, an increase of 55 per cent on the initial budget of $998.9 million. 
Significant additional costs of approximately $200.1 million, over the budgeted amount 
of $106.8 million, were incurred for operating the Metcard system in parallel with myki 
beyond its contracted termination date in 2007. 
Issues with implementing myki 
There were a number of implementation issues with myki—including slow card reader 
response times, intermittent technical failures particularly on trams and buses, and 
concerns with the accuracy of data for measuring patronage. 
The Public Transport Ombudsman received over 5 450 complaints about myki 
between July 2010 and June 2014. Most of the issues raised were associated with 
account charges and refunds and reimbursements. 
Data maintained by PTV shows that during the same period it received in excess of 
200 000 complaints and enquiries relating to myki. 
Our 2012 audit, Fare Evasion on Public Transport, also noted a significant increase in 
metropolitan fare evasion between 2009 and 2011 due to the decline in effective 
enforcement during the transition to myki. However, the estimated fare evasion on 
Melbourne's public transport network has since dropped to its lowest level since 2008. 
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Given the significant delay, additional costs and challenges in delivering myki, the 
former government commissioned a review of the system in late 2010 to determine its 
future. Following this review it decided to proceed with implementing myki but with a 
reduced scope. The contract with the myki operator was subsequently amended in 
November 2011 and March 2013 to reflect the revised approach. 
The current myki contract service term is due to expire on 30 June 2016. PTV is 
currently planning to retender the operation of the myki system. 
1.3 Reviews of public transport ticketing 
Previous performance audits  
Our 1990 audit Met Ticket, and 1998 audit Automating Fare Collection: A major 
initiative in public transport, examined the state's previous public transport ticketing 
solutions.  
Both of these audits found that fast tracking the development of these ticketing 
systems led to successive delays and cost blowouts in implementation, which exposed 
the state to major risks of not achieving system objectives. 
Specifically, our 1990 audit Met Ticket found that a compressed time frame for 
implementing Met Ticket meant that certain desirable project management principles 
were bypassed. Specifically, multiple variations to the initial proposal occurred during 
the rollout, which complicated implementation and resulted in delays. The audit also 
found that, consequently, substantial effort and cost was incurred with only minimal 
benefit to public transport users and the government. 
Despite the lessons from the Met Ticket experience noted in our 1990 report, in 1998 
we identified similar weaknesses with the implementation of Met Ticket's successor, 
Metcard. In particular this audit found that the decision to fast track Metcard's 
implementation resulted in a failure to properly analyse the system's costs and 
benefits, and set unrealistic milestones, leading to delays.   
Our 2007 audit New Ticketing System Tender examined the tender process for myki, 
including the lessons arising for the future management of major tenders. The report 
concluded that TTA established an ‘innovative tender process and largely achieved its 
objectives for the procurement phase’ of the project. It also identified some areas 
where probity management could be improved, in particular, ensuring that the probity 
protocols work to minimise the risk of actual or perceived conflicts of interest.  
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Other reviews of myki 
State agencies, Parliament and the Victorian Ombudsman have also previously 
reviewed the status and implementation of myki. Key reviews include:  
 Project review of the myki ticketing system, DTF,  February 2011 
 Own motion investigation into ICT-enabled projects, Ombudsman Victoria, 
November 2011, conducted in conjunction with VAGO 
 Inquiry into Effective Decision Making for the Successful Delivery Of Significant 
Infrastructure Projects, Public Accounts and Estimates Committee, 
December 2012 
 Lessons learned review of the myki ticketing system, DTF, April 2014 
These reviews have all identified significant issues with the governance and 
contractual arrangements that were established: 
 The roles and responsibilities of key governance bodies were not clearly defined. 
Consequently, this made it difficult to determine which agencies were responsible 
for different aspects of the project and this resulted in ineffective communication 
between key parties. 
 The original contract was large, complex and outcomes-based. This meant that 
the functional performance requirements of the system were not clearly defined. 
This ultimately led to confusion over the responsibilities of the contractor, 
incurring delays and budget increases.  
1.4 Institutional arrangements and responsibilities 
Transport Ticketing Authority 
The TTA was established in June 2003 to manage the Metcard ticketing system and to 
procure and manage a new replacement ticketing system, now known as myki. The 
TTA completed its role in the delivery of myki and the management of the Metcard 
system in December 2012, with PTV assuming responsibility for all TTA functions from 
January 2013. 
Public Transport Victoria 
PTV's primary objective under the Transport Integration Act 2010 is to plan, coordinate, 
provide, operate and maintain a safe, punctual, reliable and clean public transport 
system consistent with the vision statement and transport system objectives contained 
in the Act. This includes providing and operating a public transport ticketing system, 
managing the public transport ticketing system contract, and the collection and 
distribution of farebox revenue.  
Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport & 
Resources  
The Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport & Resources (DEDJTR) 
is responsible for leading strategic policy, planning and improvements relating to the 
transport network.  
Background 
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DEDJTR is currently a member of the myki Ticketing Advisory Group—which advises 
the PTV board on myki matters—and the myki Ticketing Services Retender steering 
committee—which provides advice and guidance relating to the retender of myki. 
Department of Treasury and Finance 
DTF’s role and involvement in the project has varied over its life cycle. This has 
included observer membership of the former TTA board, current membership of the 
Ticketing Advisory Group, participation in the Ticketing Services project steering 
committee and reviewing associated progress reports. From 2010 DTF expanded its 
monitoring and review function as the project is now monitored under the High Value 
High Risk framework. DTF also led negotiations with the vendor following the review of 
the project, which was initiated by the former government and completed in 2011. 
 
1.5 Audit objective and scope 
The objective of the audit was to examine the operational effectiveness of the myki 
ticketing system by assessing whether: 
• arrangements in place for the system’s implementation and ongoing 
management are effective 
• expected outcomes and benefits from the introduction of myki for users, 
operators and the state have been, or are on track to being, achieved.  
The audit focused on how well PTV is managing and operating the myki ticketing 
system. Specifically, it examined whether governance and contractual arrangements 
including frameworks for monitoring and evaluation, assure myki’s operational 
effectiveness. It also included DEDJTR due to its role in working with PTV on future 
contract planning, and DTF due to its role in overseeing and monitoring the project. 
Background 
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1.6 Audit method and cost 
The audit was conducted in accordance with the Australian Auditing and Assurance 
Standards. Pursuant to section 20(3) of the Audit Act 1994, unless otherwise indicated 
any persons named in this report are not the subject of adverse comment or opinion.  
The cost of the audit was $415 000. 
1.7 Structure of the report 
The report has three further parts: 
• Part 2 examines whether governance and contractual arrangements support 
effective implementation and operation of myki.  
• Part 3 examines: 
• the performance of the myki system and adequacy of arrangements for 
monitoring the contractor's performance  
• whether expected outcomes and benefits from the introduction of myki for 
users, operators and the state have been, or are on track to being, achieved. 
• Part 4 examines whether planning for the retender for managing myki's ongoing 
operation is soundly based and designed to deliver a value-for-money outcome. 
• Appendix A shows the extent of myki use on the regional train, coach and town 
bus network.  
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2  Governance and contractual arrangements 
At a glance 
Background  
The myki project has been complex and large-scale from its conception and through its 
development and procurement. For such projects sound governance and contract 
management arrangements are essential for assuring key risks to delivery are 
effectively managed, and that intended benefits are achieved. 
Conclusion 
The myki system experienced significant delays and cost increases largely due to 
deficiencies in the original governance, project planning and contractual arrangements. 
Subsequent changes to the contract, including strengthened governance 
arrangements, have largely addressed these deficiencies.  
Findings  
• The original myki governance structure was poorly defined and implemented—
hampering the project's management.  
• Revised governance arrangements established following Public Transport 
Victoria’s creation in 2012 have substantially addressed the previous deficiencies. 
• Implementation difficulties arose from critical deficiencies in the design of myki's 
initial contract that compromised its viability, including: 
• poorly defined functional performance requirements 
• a lack of flexibility to address contractor underperformance 
• unrealistic delivery time frames. 
• Amendments to the contract since myki's initial development and rollout have 
addressed unrealistic delivery time lines, and have improved the contract's 
financial viability. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The myki project has been complex and large-scale from its conception and through its 
development and procurement. Sound governance and oversight of such projects is 
essential for assuring risks to delivery are effectively managed, and that intended 
benefits are achieved. 
This requires effective mechanisms for project monitoring and risk management to 
support timely decision-making in response to emerging issues.  
It also requires clearly defined deliverables and responsibilities, and effective contract 
management to ensure responsible parties meet their respective obligations and 
achieve the contract's objectives.   
This Part of the report examines whether myki's governance and contractual 
arrangements support its effective implementation and operation.  
2.2 Conclusion 
The myki system has experienced significant delays and cost increases. This is largely 
due to deficiencies in the original contract and governance arrangements. 
The roles and responsibilities of key agencies initially charged with myki's development 
were neither well defined nor effectively implemented. This led to uncertainty and 
delays in decision-making—particularly during myki's initial build and rollout.  
The ambitious initial scale and poorly defined 
functional performance requirements for myki 
also contributed to significant delays in its 
implementation. Collectively, these challenges 
compromised the viability of myki's initial 
scope and contract, and precipitated six major 
contractual amendments as the project 
encountered significant difficulties. 
While these amendments strengthened the 
contract, they also substantially reduced 
myki's scope and extended its delivery time 
frames by seven years. This compromised 
achievement of the project's original objectives 
and expected benefits. 
Since it was established in April 2012, Public 
Transport Victoria (PTV) has improved 
governance and contractual arrangements to 
support the oversight and operation of myki. 
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2.3 Governance arrangements supporting the 
delivery and operation of myki  
The governance arrangements for the myki project have been scrutinised by several 
reviews over the past four years. These reviews consistently identified significant 
weaknesses that needed to be addressed. 
Department of Treasury and Finance's 2011 Project review of the 
myki ticketing system 
This review examined the initial myki contract and rollout, including the government's 
options for proceeding with or discontinuing myki. 
The review found that myki's original communication, decision-making and 
accountability arrangements were ‘troublesome’. In particular, it noted there was a lack 
of clarity regarding whether the former Department of Transport (DOT) or the Transport 
Ticketing Authority (TTA) was the ultimate decision-maker on issues, and that poor 
engagement between the myki contractor and public transport operators contributed to 
a difficult working relationship that negatively impacted the project.  
The review also found that: 
 the TTA board and public transport operators were excluded from the governance 
arrangements 
 TTA did not have clear accountability and authority to directly manage the 
contractor  
 the role and authority of all project-related groups was unclear and lacked 
integration.  
The review noted that these arrangements needed to be clarified and strengthened if 
the state decided to proceed with the project. 
Victorian Ombudsman 2011 Own motion investigation into 
ICT-enabled projects 
This investigation examined 10 major ICT-enabled projects, including myki, to 
determine whether they were on budget and on time, and if they met the needs for 
which they were designed. 
The Ombudsman was critical of the fact that TTA's board initially did not include a 
representative from DOT, given that DOT had policy responsibility for ticketing issues 
and TTA was reliant on it for promptly addressing its requests. The Ombudsman also 
questioned if the board had the requisite experience and skills to implement an ICT 
project of the size and complexity of myki.  
Similarly, our 2007 audit New Ticketing System Tender found that, for most of the 
tender period, the board consisted of only two members and that a larger board was 
warranted given the size and complexity of the tender. 
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Public Accounts and Estimates Committee’s 2012 Inquiry into 
Effective Decision Making for the Successful Delivery Of 
Significant Infrastructure Projects  
The Public Accounts and Estimates Committee's (PAEC) 2012 inquiry into the 
decision-making underpinning successful infrastructure projects examined six projects, 
including myki, to identify lessons learned. 
The inquiry found myki lacked continuity in project management and governance, and 
that TTA did not possess the capability and capacity needed to effectively manage the 
project. It also noted that significant changes to key personnel exposed the project to 
greater risks than if there had been a consistent, high-quality team running it. 
Department of Treasury and Finance 2014 Lessons learned 
review of the myki ticketing system 
This review examined critical issues affecting myki's delivery within the originally 
approved time frame and budget. 
The review found that the original governance structure made it very difficult to identify 
which agency had overall accountability for the project and what aspects of the project 
each agency was responsible for. Consistent with the Ombudsman's 2011 
investigation, the review noted that the relationship between TTA and the former DOT 
was not clearly defined. Specifically, while DOT had policy responsibility for ticketing 
issues, it did not have a representative on the TTA board initially and therefore no 
visibility of policy implementation. 
The review further noted that ineffective communication between the two agencies 
compounded the structural deficiencies—with TTA having to wait for DOT to respond to 
policy enquiries that may have had time-critical implications. Because of this reliance 
on DOT to clarify policy issues, TTA did not have complete control over meeting 
prescribed project deadlines. DTF therefore concluded that the design and operation of 
the governance arrangements was ineffective. DTF also noted that, had there been a 
closer working relationship between DOT and TTA, or if DOT had membership on the 
board, TTA’s functioning with regard to policy issues may have been greatly improved.   
Revised governance arrangements  
The governance arrangements for the myki project were revised following PTV's 
establishment in 2012. The new arrangements have substantially addressed the 
previous deficiencies. In particular, PTV has now assumed the functions of managing 
the public transport system and myki, which were formerly separate functions under 
DOT and TTA respectively. 
This fundamental change has, in effect, resolved the previous disconnect in 
responsibilities for public transport ticketing policy development and implementation 
that hampered TTA's management of myki. It has also clarified PTV's role, 
decision-making authority and accountability for managing the myki contractor. 
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PTV's updated governance structure for myki includes arrangements designed to 
strengthen: 
 cross-agency coordination 
 engagement between PTV, the myki contractor and public transport operators 
 PTV's expertise and capability for managing the contract. 
Figure 2A outlines the revised governance arrangements. 
  Figure 2A
Current governance arrangements  
Name Description 
Ticketing 
Advisory 
Group  
Established 
January 2013 
Membership—chaired by PTV and made up of senior management staff 
from PTV, the Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and 
Resources (DEDJTR), DTF and the Department of Premier and Cabinet. 
Purpose—to advise the PTV board on the operations of the myki ticketing 
system with a focus on service to customers and to the operators.  
Operational 
Control Group  
Established 
March 2013 
Membership—jointly chaired by PTV and the myki contractor and made up 
of three senior members from PTV and three from the contractor. 
Purpose—reports to the Ticketing Advisory Group and is responsible for 
overseeing and/or approving business planning, cost saving initiatives, 
major budget or cost variations, performance of the system, and the 
forward capital works program.  
Change 
Advisory Board 
Established 
March 2013 
Membership—comprises senior PTV managers and subject matter 
experts who are invited to attend, if necessary, in an advisory capacity to 
provide technical input. 
Purpose—to review, assess and approve contract variation requests 
related to the myki contact. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
In addition to these arrangements, Figure 2B outlines other initiatives recently 
introduced by PTV to improve its engagement with public transport operators and the 
myki contractor.  
  Figure 2B
Operator engagement initiatives 
Initiative Description 
Fortnightly Ticketing 
Services meetings 
Established 2013 
Membership—comprised of PTV staff, the myki contractor and 
public transport operators. 
Purpose—a forum to raise, discuss and resolve issues with myki. 
Metropolitan and 
Regional Bus 
Ticketing Services 
Group 
Established August 2014 
Membership—chaired by PTV and comprised of metropolitan and 
regional bus operators and PTV representatives. 
Purpose—to meet and discuss operational matters relating to 
myki, including identifying systemic and emerging myki device 
issues. 
Network Development 
Partnerships 
Established 2012 
Membership—PTV and public transport operators.  
Purpose—its main purpose is to discuss public transport 
performance issues, progress and emerging issues. However, 
issues with myki are also raised on occasions. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
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2.4 Contractual arrangements for myki 
Previous reviews of myki have also found significant problems with the original 
contractual arrangements. These problems impacted the build, initial implementation 
and operation of myki and were linked to: 
 poorly defined functional performance requirements 
 a lack of flexibility in the initial contract to address underperformance 
 unrealistic time frames 
 poor financial viability of the initial contract. 
Poorly defined functional performance requirements 
The Ombudsman's 2011 investigation noted that the original myki contract was large 
and complex with over 13 000 pages and 40 schedules. It also found that the contract 
was difficult to manage as it was outcomes rather than requirements based, meaning it 
was unclear whether certain functional requirements were within or outside the scope 
of the contract. This led to disputes with the contractor about costs and priorities.  
DTF's 2014 review similarly found that the contract lacked sufficient specificity as the 
required functional performance of the system was not clearly defined.  
Additionally, PAEC's 2012 inquiry noted that the state and contractor would have been 
better served ‘if more time had been invested in the beginning’ to explore and get a 
common understanding of the requirements.  
Lack of flexibility to address contractor underperformance  
DTF's 2014 review found that the structure of the contract covering the project's build 
and operations phase did not provide the flexibility to suspend or exit the contract to 
address underperformance. This complicated the system's rollout, including the state's 
relationship with the contractor, as the operations phase was allowed to commence 
before the build was complete and related issues were resolved.  
In particular, this meant that outstanding build issues had to be managed by the 
contractor in parallel with the commencement of operations which compromised the 
contractor's capacity to meet prescribed milestones and, ultimately, the project’s 
delivery. 
Unrealistic time frames 
Early decisions in the planning phase of the myki project caused subsequent 
challenges that necessitated contractual amendments. In particular, the expiration of 
the former Metcard contract in 2007 was the catalyst for introducing myki and seeking 
to implement it within the ambitious time frame of two years. 
This time line, stipulated in the initial contract, proved to be unrealistic and affected the 
contractor’s ability to meet milestones and receive milestone delivery payments. Since 
myki commenced operating in 2009, contract payments of $27 million were withheld 
from the contractor for its failure to achieve milestones. 
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TTA advised the 2012 PAEC inquiry that the time frame had ‘been the biggest single 
cause of project difficulties’ with the contractor consistently failing to meet milestones 
during the initial build phase of the project. The contract was subsequently amended, 
which reset the project's milestones. 
The complexity of the project was significantly underestimated and DTF’s 2014 review 
noted that, ‘no other jurisdiction in the world had developed and delivered a ticketing 
procurement strategy that included an outcomes-based specification through an open 
architecture approach in the two year time frame committed. The initial project 
planning did not take into account international experience on the implementation of 
new ticketing systems’. According to the review, if the contract had been appropriately 
benchmarked against projects around the world, which were similar in complexity, size, 
budget and time, the majority of changes subsequently incorporated in the contract 
may not have been necessary.  
 
Financial viability of the contract 
The 2011 DTF review noted that neither the contractor nor TTA felt the operating phase 
of the contract was commercially viable. Scope extensions in multiple areas including 
cash collection, card distribution and system maintenance had increased costs beyond 
what could be borne by the contractor. The contractor also highlighted that there were 
cost implications stemming from commencing operations in parallel with the delivery 
phase in 2009, rather than at the end of delivery.  
A further issue affecting the commercial viability of the contract was its failure to 
accommodate the increased operating costs for the system arising from the 
30 per cent growth in public transport patronage that occurred during its 
implementation. Contractual amendments had addressed the increased capital costs 
associated with patronage growth, but not the operations and maintenance costs. 
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Key themes 
These issues with the myki project identified by the Ombudsman and PAEC are 
consistent with the key themes emerging from their related examination of other major 
ICT projects. These themes highlight that:  
 poorly defined governance structures with unclear roles and responsibilities have 
hampered project management 
 inadequate planning has led to significant delays, cost increases and failures to 
achieve original objectives  
 overly-ambitious and poorly-scoped projects have unnecessarily heightened 
project complexity and risk 
 inadequate ICT capability within agencies has contributed to poor project 
management. 
2.4.1 Contractual amendments  
Since the initial contract was awarded, there have been numerous variations and 
six major contractual amendments directed at addressing these issues. Figure 2C 
summarises the contractual amendments agreed between the parties. 
  Figure 2C
Summary of major amendments to the myki contract 
Title and date of 
amendment Major amendments incorporated in the contract 
Delivery phase 
Amending Deed 1 
(December 2006) 
Finalised various matters not concluded at contractual close, including 
the definition of card ordering processes, the key performance 
indicator regime and phase completion conditions. 
Amending Deed 2 
(January 2008) 
Gave TTA new rights in the event that the contractor did not complete 
the Regional Bus Pilot Trial by the set date. This included the 
repayment of $20 million and the ability to terminate the contract if this 
was not achieved. 
Amending Deed 3  
(June 2008) 
Settled previously disputed scope claims to enable full delivery of 
myki. Reset the project time lines and payment schedule, and 
increased liquidated damages in the event the new time line was not 
met. 
Amending Deed 4  
(June 2009) 
Changed the process of ordering and payment for smart cards. TTA 
agreed to pay for smartcards as soon as they received them. Prior to 
this amendment, TTA would pay for smartcards when they were sold 
to customers. 
Amending Deed 5 
(November 2011) 
 
 
Resolved outstanding scope issues relating to the build phase, reset 
the project schedule to 2019 including related milestones and 
payments. 
Scope changes as part of this amendment as recommended by DTF’s 
review included: 
 elimination of disposable smartcards 
 removing deployment of card vending machines on trams 
 changes to V/Line implementation—proceeding with the rollout of 
myki across V/Line interurban services and deferring the 
implementation on the V/Line intercity services. 
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Figure 2C 
Summary of major amendments to the myki contract – continued 
Title and date of 
amendment Major amendments incorporated in the contract 
Operating phase 
Amending Deed 6 
(March 2013) 
 
Set the parameters for the operation of myki including: 
 a shorter-term contract to mid-2016 instead of April 2019 
 introduced a ‘cost plus’ reimbursement model  
 altered the risk allocation and commercial incentives 
 a new incentive and abatement regime to drive superior 
performance and the right to terminate the contract for repeated 
severe poor performance 
 the state taking responsibility for the myki call centre and 
associated cardholder support functions. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on information from Public Transport Victoria.  
The extent of changes to the contract indicates that the initial planning underestimated 
the complexity of implementing a new ticketing system. It also suggests that more time 
should have been spent developing the contract to more clearly define requirements 
and critical milestones.  
Impact of key amendments 
The most significant contractual changes were Amending Deeds 5 and 6, which 
addressed the unrealistic time lines and financial viability of the contract. 
Amending Deed 5 ensured the deliverability of myki by reducing its scope to enable it 
to be rolled out by the revised due date of December 2012 when Metcard was to be 
switched off. 
Amending Deed 6 was implemented to address the risk that the contractor may 
minimise or discontinue support for the system because the project was financially 
unviable. This amendment fundamentally changed the contract and how the state 
would pay for myki. The key changes included: 
 the adoption of a ‘cost plus’ reimbursement model, rather than a fixed price 
arrangement—this meant the total cost of the system under the contract is no 
longer capped and ensured it was financially viable for the contractor 
 a redefined scope of services, with some services no longer performed by the 
contractor—including call centre operations 
 changed key performance indicators, encompassing financial incentives and 
abatements. 
The introduction of the ‘cost plus’ reimbursement model and financial incentives for 
sustained good performance has improved the commercial viability of the contract. 
However, shortcomings with PTV's approach to verifying the contractor's performance 
data are compromising its capacity to assure the integrity of performance-based 
payments. This is further discussed in Part 3 of the report.  
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3  Performance monitoring and benefits realisation 
At a glance 
Background  
Public Transport Victoria (PTV) needs an effective performance measurement and 
reporting framework in order to ensure that myki operates effectively, and delivers the 
intended benefits.  
Conclusion 
PTV has enhanced the quality of performance measures and incentives in the myki 
contract. However, the effectiveness and integrity of the new performance regime is 
compromised by critical shortcomings in PTV's approach to verifying the accuracy of 
related results reported by the contractor.  
Findings  
• The performance measures in the initial myki contract were difficult to interpret 
and apply, and impeded effective contract management. 
• Although newly developed measures have improved in clarity and focus, 
fundamental issues remain. Specifically: 
• current metrics in the contract's new performance regime do not address key 
aspects of operational performance  
• there is no framework for assessing myki's overall effectiveness, efficiency 
and benefits.  
• Performance data indicates that the contractor has met most performance 
targets, however, PTV cannot assure the accuracy of this information. 
• Current Cabinet conventions preclude access to the original myki business case, 
which is needed to facilitate a post-implementation and benefits review.  
Recommendations 
• That PTV reviews and strengthens its performance monitoring framework for 
myki prior to awarding the new contract.  
• That the Department of Treasury and Finance coordinate with the Department of 
Premier and Cabinet to advise the government on the impacts of current Cabinet 
conventions on the Gateway Review and High Value High Risk framework and 
related benefits reviews.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Public Transport Victoria (PTV) needs an effective performance measurement and 
reporting framework in order to ensure that the system operates effectively, and 
delivers the intended benefits.  
Such a framework depends on the availability of sufficient, appropriate and reliable 
performance data and on PTV regularly monitoring critical aspects of performance. 
This includes monitoring whether services are being delivered in accordance with the 
contractual standards so that timely action can be taken to address emerging issues. 
This Part of the report examines: 
 the operational performance of myki and adequacy of arrangements for 
monitoring the contractor's performance 
 whether expected outcomes and benefits from the introduction of myki for users, 
operators and the state have been, or are on track to be, achieved. 
3.2 Conclusion 
PTV has enhanced the quality of the performance measures and incentives in the myki 
contract, and their potential to drive improved performance. 
However, the effectiveness and integrity of the new performance regime is currently 
compromised by critical shortcomings in PTV's approach to verifying the accuracy of 
related results reported by the contractor. 
PTV needs to urgently address these issues as they reduce assurance that current 
incentive payments are appropriate and justified. 
Further, the absence of arrangements for monitoring myki's overall effectiveness, 
efficiency and achievement of benefits, means there is currently no evidence to 
demonstrate its impact on the performance and management of the public transport 
system. However, the significant delays, budget increases and substantial reductions 
in myki's scope over time strongly indicate that it has failed to fully meet its original 
objectives. 
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3.3 Measuring myki's performance 
3.3.1 Issues with previous monitoring arrangements 
The performance regime in the initial myki contract was complex, onerous and, with 
81 measures, difficult to apply in practice. Further, the performance measures only 
applied once myki was fully operational. The Department of Treasury and Finance 
(DTF) had raised concerns with the performance regime in a number of ministerial 
briefings. For example, a 2012 DTF briefing to the Treasurer noted that the 
performance measures in the contract were ‘difficult to interpret and apply’ and that a 
new regime was needed to drive ‘appropriate behaviours’ from the contractor. A 
subsequent 2013 DTF briefing to the Treasurer similarly noted that ‘more measurable 
and enforceable key performance indicator targets’ were needed. 
A contractual amendment introduced in March 2013—Amending Deed 6—sought to 
address these shortcomings by establishing a new performance regime. Key changes 
to the contract included: 
 deleting obsolete measures relating to services that were removed from the 
contract—this substantially reduced the measures from 81 to 27 
 establishing an incentive and abatement regime to drive improvements in 
customer service and system reliability, by linking the contractor's performance 
against defined standards to financial incentives and penalties. 
3.3.2 New performance measures 
The new performance regime includes 27 measures aligned with seven service 
categories specified in the contract: 
 distribution services—the supply, distribution and stock management of 
smartcards 
 cash collection—the collection of cash from card vending machines and ticket 
offices and the replenishment of cash, smartcards and consumables 
 scheme administration—the administration and maintenance of data and 
products  
 device management—the implementation, updating, operation and maintenance 
of devices 
 financial management—the time lines of financial settlement, reconciliation and 
investigation of associated discrepancies 
 technical support—the management of the operational, functional and 
performance aspects of the back office systems, and system connectivity with 
devices  
 operational support—response to queries from transport operators, myki 
retailers and PTV.  
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The new regime has improved the clarity and focus of performance measures in the 
contract, and its potential to drive improved performance. In particular, the new regime 
has heightened the focus on service aspects that previously emerged as critical 
performance issues. Specifically, new measures have introduced incentives for the 
contractor to promptly address faults with myki devices and related software upgrades, 
which previously disrupted system operations. The new regime has also increased the 
contractor's focus on assuring the accuracy of the financial information recorded by the 
system. 
3.3.3 Limitations of the current performance regime 
Limited focus on equipment availability 
While the contract amendments improved the performance measures in the original 
contract, fundamental issues remain.  
Specifically, the performance regime is focused on availability rather than performance. 
That is, it does not adequately measure how well the equipment operates as distinct 
from the length of time for which it is functioning and available. For example, the speed 
of transaction processing—the response times of myki fare readers, including 
entry/exit gates—is not measured.  
This is a critical omission given that a key intended benefit of myki is fast and 
convenient ticketing for the travelling public. PTV's testing of transaction speed at entry 
and exit points on all device types during the implementation of myki reinforces the 
importance of such measures, as it showed that this ranged from 1.8 to 4.2 seconds 
against a design target of 1.2 seconds. 
Current measures also fail to distinguish performance problems with equipment at 
busy train stations during peak periods, an obviously critical performance issue, from 
similar issues with equipment at infrequently used stations during off peak periods. 
Lack of system-wide and benefits monitoring 
There is no overarching framework for monitoring the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the myki ticketing system. 
The new performance regime is limited to monitoring the contractor's performance and 
does not enable assessment of the extent to which myki's broader intended benefits 
and value for money have been achieved.  
This issue is discussed further in Section 3.7. 
3.3.4 Limitations of other monitoring activities 
PTV produces a number of monitoring reports that supplement the performance 
information about myki it derives from the contract's performance regime. While these 
reports provide useful insights, they do not provide a complete view of myki's 
performance, nor are they sufficient to verify all the performance information submitted 
by the myki contractor. 
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Specifically, these reports include: 
• operational performance monitoring reports which focus on myki device 
availability, transaction capture by the system, the condition of selected devices 
and the status of maintenance works 
• device management dashboard reports which focus on the status of 
maintenance works for all myki devices  
• operator dashboard reports for trains and trams which similarly focus on 
maintenance issues as well as tracking the number of card sales and 'touch-ons' 
• metro trains device downtime reports, which focus exclusively on the myki 
system's 'availability' across the train network. 
A key limitation of the above reports is that, like the contract's performance regime, 
they mainly focus on the 'availability' and condition of myki devices, rather than on how 
well the system performs. 
While PTV's operational performance monitoring reports examine aspects of myki's 
performance, this is limited to assessing a sample of bus, tram and train card vending 
machines and if they are functioning, and the responsiveness of selected myki card 
readers on a sample of trams and buses. 
Other limitations of the operational performance monitoring reports include: 
• they make no reference to the standard used for assessing the responsiveness of 
devices and only describe changes in performance relative to previous reports, 
meaning the basis of the assessment is unclear 
• they do not assess the performance of myki entry/exit gates and card readers 
across the train network, despite initial PTV testing during the rollout showing the 
system performed worse than the contractual standard 
• the reports do not provide up-to-date intelligence on how the system is currently 
performing 
• the reports do not cover the range of measures reported on by the contractor for 
determining incentive payments and abatements, meaning they cannot be 
reliably used to verify all monthly results reported to PTV by the contractor. 
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PTV also advised that it maintains a register of incidents, such as equipment faults, 
that have impacted the myki system which it considers when assessing the 
contractor's performance in relation to the incentive and abatement scheme. However, 
the information in this register is limited as it depends on the vigilance of staff and 
customers to report such incidents to PTV. Unless PTV is informed, it is unlikely to be 
aware of and record the incident. Consequently, there is a risk that the real level of 
equipment faults may be understated. 
3.3.5 Incentives and abatement regime 
The new performance regime now incorporates performance-based payments linked 
to 12 of the 27 performance measures. The contractor has the opportunity to receive 
incentive payments for sustained positive performance against these measures. The 
incentive scheme is separated into two categories—customer service and system 
reliability. Incentive payments are calculated separately for each category. 
The performance regime also provides for abating the contractor's monthly service 
charge for sustained poor performance across the 27 measures. Figure 3A provides an 
overview of the incentive and abatement regime. 
  Figure 3A
Overview of the incentive and abatement regime 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on information from Public Transport Victoria. 
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• Contractor eligible 
for initial payment 
of $150 000 per 
category when 
accrued deficit 
points remain at 
or below 1 000 for 
three consecutive 
months. 
• Incentive of 
$50 000 per 
month applied for 
each month when 
criteria is met.  
• Contractor eligible 
for initial payment 
of $150 000 per 
category when 
accrued deficit 
points remain at 
or below 1 000 for 
three consecutive 
months.  
• Incentive of 
$50 000 per 
month applied for 
each month when 
criteria is met.  
• Range of measures under each service category. 
• Abatement is calculated based on a deficit points 
system where one point equals $1, accrued when 
measures do not meet performance standards. 
• Abatement is applied when total deficit points are 
greater than the service threshold—2 000 points. 
• Abatement is capped at 10 per cent of the monthly 
service charge. 
Abatement 
 (27 measures) 
Incentives 
(12 measures) 
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A deficit point system is used to determine whether the contractor is eligible to receive 
an incentive payment or if the contractor's monthly service charge should be abated. 
Deficit points are accrued when the contractor does not meet a measure's target. Each 
measure has a different method for calculating how deficit points are accrued. 
Under the regime, the contractor is eligible for an initial incentive payment of $150 000 
per category when the total number of accrued deficit points for the category remain at, 
or below, 1 000 for three consecutive months. For each subsequent month that deficit 
points remains below the threshold, a further incentive payment of $50 000 per 
category is awarded. If the number of deficit points exceeds the threshold in a 
particular month, no incentive is awarded for the category, and the three-month period 
is reset. This means the contractor will need to achieve another three months of 
sustained good performance to qualify for an incentive payment.  
The contractor's monthly service charge can be abated for poor performance. The 
abatement figure is calculated from the deficit point system, with each deficit point 
equalling $1. If the number of deficit points accrued across all 27 measures within a 
month is below 2 000, no abatement is applied. However, once this threshold is 
exceeded, the full abatement amount is enforceable. This abatement amount cannot 
exceed 10 per cent of the monthly services charge of approximately $5 million.  
The contractor is able to receive an incentive payment for one or both service 
categories and still be liable for an abatement if performance in one or more of the 
27 measures is poor. 
As at December 2014, PTV had paid $1.4 million in performance-linked incentives, and 
had applied abatements totalling $325 000 since the regime commenced in April 2013. 
Figure 3B shows the net incentive payment for each month during this period. 
  Figure 3B
Net incentive payment, April 2013 to December 2014 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on information from Public Transport Victoria.  
-100 000
-50 000
50 000
100 000
150 000
200 000
250 000
Apr
13
May
13
Jun
13
Jul
13
Aug
13
Sep
13
Oct
13
Nov
13
Dec
13
Jan
14
Feb
14
Mar
14
Apr
14
May
14
Jun
14
Jul
14
Aug
14
Sep
14
Oct
14
Nov
14
Dec
14
Dollars
Performance monitoring and benefits realisation 
 
28       Operational Effectiveness of the myki Ticketing System Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
Our analysis of data supplied by PTV shows that apart from the first three months of 
the new incentive and abatement regime, the contractor has consistently received 
incentive payments for meeting or exceeding performance requirements.  
Although these results indicate sustained good performance, it is not possible to 
assess whether current standards—including incentives and abatement thresholds—
have been set appropriately, as PTV did not document the rationale underpinning 
current performance benchmarks and how they equate to satisfactory performance.  
PTV needs to review these measures prior to awarding the new myki contract, 
including whether the standards and related financial incentives are set at appropriate 
levels. 
3.4 Monitoring of myki's performance 
The myki contract requires the operator to prepare a monthly operational report on its 
performance across the 27 indicators. This information is used by PTV to assess the 
contractor's performance. 
3.4.1 Verification of contractor's monthly reports 
The integrity and effectiveness of the performance regime depends heavily on the 
availability of accurate and reliable data. PTV reviews the monthly performance report 
submitted by the contractor and prepares a verification report highlighting any 
discrepancies. PTV advised that if a discrepancy is detected, the contractor is informed 
of the issue and, where agreed and deemed appropriate, relevant modifications are 
made to the contractor's report. If an agreement cannot be reached, the issue can be 
referred for dispute resolution to the Operational Control Group. Evidence provided by 
PTV shows that this process has previously led to changes in the contractor's reports 
following the detection of such discrepancies.  
However, PTV's verification activities are limited and do not provide sufficient 
assurance that the source data used by the contractor to compile performance reports 
is accurate. This means that PTV cannot reliably verify the accuracy of the results 
reported by the contractor and therefore assure that all incentive payments are 
appropriate.  
PTV does not currently have all the information needed to sufficiently assess and 
validate the contractor's reported results. Under the contract, PTV can conduct an 
audit which would give it access to the performance data and systems maintained by 
the contractor. However, PTV has not done so. In the absence of follow-the-dollar 
powers, we have not been able to verify what information the contractor holds and 
whether it supports information reported to PTV. 
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We found that on most occasions PTV was unable to verify the accuracy of the 
following 18 performance measures, nine of which directly related to incentive 
payments reported by the contractor from April 2013 to July 2014: 
 For all six technical support measures, two-thirds of the PTV verification reports 
we examined stated ‘PTV receives no data to be able to qualify (the contractor’s) 
reported data for the month’ or there is simply no information recorded.  
 For three of the four operational support measures, 87 per cent of PTV's 
verification reports had no verification analysis, or similarly state that it has no 
data to verify the contractor’s claim that no notable critical incidents have 
occurred.  
 For all three of the cash collection measures, no verification assessment 
occurred in 75 per cent of the reports. 
 For two of the four device management measures, there is similarly no 
verification analysis in 90 per cent of the reports we examined. In three instances 
the reports note that ‘there is a very large discrepancy between the data supplied 
by the contractor and that calculated by PTV’. 
 For one of the smartcard management measures, no verification assessment 
occurred in 87 per cent of the reports. 
 PTV's verification reports similarly state that the performance thresholds for the 
three scheme administration measures are disputed by the contractor, meaning 
that agreed time frames are not clarified, preventing verification of whether the 
abatement standard has been met.  
PTV needs to urgently address these issues as they are impacting on the 
effectiveness and integrity of the performance regime.  
3.4.2 Issues impacting reliability of myki performance 
measures 
Although PTV's verification activities are limited, they have nevertheless exposed 
several issues with the contractor's performance data. These issues further reduce 
assurance over the accuracy and reliability of the data upon which performance 
incentives are based.  
For example, PTV’s comparison of data about the availability of myki devices reported 
by the contractor to that arising from its own spot checks, has revealed material 
differences that can impact payments arising from the incentive and abatement 
scheme. Figure 3C summarises this data for the period January 2012 to April 2013. 
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  Figure 3C
Per cent of myki devices available,  
comparison between contractor data and PTV data 
Data source 
January–
March 2012 
May– 
July 2012 
September–
November 2012 
March–
April 2013 
Contractor  99.9 99.9 99.8 99.8 
PTV spot check  98.0 96.0 95.0 97.0 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office from the Public Transport Victoria, Solution 
Performance Monitoring Cycle 4. 
Although the contractor's reports show in excess of 99 per cent availability for devices, 
figures recorded from PTV's spot checks ranged between 95 and 98 per cent. The 
minimum availability standard across all devices to qualify for incentives is 
99.5 per cent, therefore if PTV is correct it could disqualify the contractor from an 
incentive payment. A DTF-commissioned review of these results noted that the reason 
for the differences is ‘quite complex and could be due to how the data is generated and 
compiled’. The DTF review found that the contractor generates device availability data 
based on the reported incidents which are recorded when an automated alarm is 
activated by devices.  
However, it is possible that devices may be out of service for short periods without 
generating an alarm. For example, a device may have software freezes that prevent 
customer interactions, while still maintaining connectivity with the back office and 
giving the impression of being fully in service. Consequently, actual device availability 
is not always reflected, and poor performance may be underreported and not 
adequately considered when assessing eligibility for incentive payments.  
3.5 Snapshot of myki's operational performance  
Figure 3D summarises the performance data reported by the myki contractor from 
April 2013 to December 2014. Although PTV cannot assure its reliability, the data 
indicates the contractor has met the performance target 86 per cent of the time over 
this 21-month period.  
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  Figure 3D
myki operational performance, April 2013 to December 2014 
Performance measures 
Months met 
(number) 
Months not met 
(number) 
Months met 
(per cent) 
Distribution services    
Smartcard fulfilment to end users(a) 19 2 90 
Card order fulfilment to many end users or a distributor from the 
one order 
21 0 100 
Card order fulfilment to distribution points 19 2 90 
Data generated by smartcard provider uploaded to the central 
system  
19 2 90 
Sub-total 78 6 93 
Cash collection    
Card Vending Machines have sufficient cash and stock to 
ensure availability for use(a) 
13 8 62 
Ticket offices have sufficient cash to ensure availability for 
ticketing operations 
17 4 81 
Data generated by cash collection agent is uploaded to the 
central system 
21 0 100 
Sub-total 51 12 81 
Scheme administration    
Administer and maintain myki scheme data(b) 21 0 100 
Administer and maintain products(a) 21 0 100 
Maintain and update transit network topology 21 0 100 
Sub-total 63 0 100 
Device management    
Field equipment commissioned correctly(b) 21 0 100 
Return terminal location to service 0 21 0 
Terminal location availability(a) 10 11 48 
Vandalised field equipment returned to a state that allows full 
ticketing services 
16 5 76 
Sub-total 47 37 56 
Financial management    
Settlement of the scheme’s daily financial activity(b) 21 0 100 
Investigate and action financial discrepancies 21 0 100 
Reconciliation services 21 0 100 
Sub-total 63 0 100 
Technical support    
Central system availability(b) 19 2 90 
Monitor and manage the external network  20 1 95 
Maintain and manage the security of the technical solution 21 0 100 
Portals updated with latest data according to schedule(b) 18 3 86 
Customer website updated with latest data according to schedule(a) 17 4 81 
Action list generation and distribution(a) 9 12 43 
Sub-total 104 22 83 
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Figure 3D 
myki operational performance, April 2013 to December 2014 – continued 
Performance measures 
Months met 
(number) 
Months not met 
(number) 
Months met 
(per cent) 
Operational support    
Support scheme participants 17 4 81 
Changes cause minimal disruption(b) 21 0 100 
Audit corrective actions 21 0 100 
Business continuity management 21 0 100 
Sub-total 80 4 95 
Total 486 81 86 
(a) Customer service measures part of incentive regime. 
(b) System reliability measures part of incentive regime. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on information from Public Transport Victoria. 
Figure 3E shows the bottom four performing measures for the period April 2013 to 
December 2014 and the percentage of months in which the measures did not meet the 
performance standard. Specifically, it suggests that the performance regime needs 
adjustment to increase the contractor's focus on addressing these issues as they have 
the potential to reduce the revenue collected by myki. 
  Figure 3E
Bottom four performing measures, April 2013 to December 2014 
Measure Description 
Months performance 
standard not met 
(per cent) 
Return terminal 
location to service 
Measures the timeliness of response to attend a 
device that is not functioning 
100 
Action list generation 
and distribution(b) 
Measures the timeliness of the availability of action 
lists which are required to support a number of key 
customer functions including auto top up 
57 
Terminal location 
availability(a) 
Measures the time to return a device to service 
following a maintenance call-out  
52 
Card vending machines 
have sufficient cash 
and stock to ensure 
availability for use(a) 
Measures cash management services to ensure myki 
machines are able to provide full customer services 
38  
(a) Customer service measures part of incentive regime. 
(b) System reliability measures part of incentive regime. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on information from Public Transport Victoria. 
PTV advised that when the contractor breaches the minimum performance standards 
they are required to submit a Corrective Action Plan with the details of the breach and 
how it will be addressed.  
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We found that six Corrective Action Plans were submitted to address breaches of 
minimum standards for the ‘Return terminal location to service’ measure during the 
period July 2013 to April 2014. The Corrective Action Plans reveal a steady decline in 
the service levels provided by a sub-contractor following the non-renewal of their 
contract. However, this measure has consistently improved since the commencement 
of a new sub-contractor in April 2014.  
3.6 Complaints about myki 
PTV, the Victorian Ombudsman and the Public Transport Ombudsman (PTO) all 
receive and investigate complaints regarding public transport services, including myki. 
PTV does not report publically on myki complaints. 
As shown in Figure 3F, data reported by PTO demonstrates that the highest 
percentage of public transport complaints during 2013–14, 35 per cent, related to myki. 
However, this has been steadily decreasing from 42 per cent in 2012–13 and 
46 per cent in 2011–12. Similarly, data maintained by PTV on the number of myki 
complaints and related enquiries shows that they are trending down with around 140 a 
day in 2013–14, compared to 190 a day in 2012–13.  
  Figure 3F
Public transport complaints and enquiries, 2013–14 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on information from the Public Transport 
Ombudsman. 
Overcharging of public transport users 
The most common issues raised with PTO were associated with account overcharging, 
and refunds and reimbursements. These two categories comprised around 45 per cent 
of myki complaints. This has increased steadily from 29 per cent in 2011–12 and 
32 per cent in 2012–13. 
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The myki system is designed to automatically calculate the lowest fare possible 
according to the zones travelled. However, in some instances public transport users 
are overcharged. Figure 3G illustrates that, overall, bus users are the most commonly 
overcharged customers.  
  Figure 3G
Number of reimbursements for overcharges,  
January 2013 to March 2015 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on information from Public Transport Victoria. 
While there has been a gradual decrease in the number of reimbursements for 
non-bus users—from a high of approximately 2 100 in August 2013, to around 60 in 
December 2014—the overcharging of bus users has remained an ongoing issue, 
although it declined sharply in early 2015. 
This was first identified as a systemic issue in 2011 by PTO where some bus users 
were being charged for travel in Zone 1 when travelling wholly in Zone 2 and vice 
versa. This occurred in areas where the zones overlapped. Some consumers were 
being incorrectly charged the higher zone fare, rather than myki correctly identifying 
the lowest fare. Similarly, other users with a myki pass permitting travel in one zone 
were being charged myki money for a different zone. 
Figure 3H shows how the myki system was designed to work on buses and when 
overcharging can occur. 
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  Figure 3H
myki bus overcharging 
How the myki system is designed to work on buses:  
Where a bus operates in Route A the myki console device can only identify Route A 
bus stops 
 
A driver logs onto the myki system when starting a bus route 
and enters Route A details into the console. This filters out 
bus stops which are not applicable to Route A. 
 
When an overcharge can occur: 
When a bus operates in Route B, but is logged in as Route A myki can only identify 
Route A bus stops 
 
If a driver logs on to an incorrect route, or does not update 
route details when beginning the next service, the myki 
system will pick up GPS points on the route that is logged 
into the system. This can result in consumers being charged 
for the wrong zone. 
When a bus operates Route A, but the system identifies GPS bus stop points from 
Route B 
 
If a driver logs in, but does not select route details, or fails to 
log on to the console, the system operates in default mode 
and locates the nearest GPS points—some of which could 
be in a different route and an incorrect zone fare applied. 
Note: The diagram is designed to provide an indicative perspective only and does not represent 
the complexity of the bus network which comprises multiple routes intersecting Zone 1 and 
Zone 2. Road maintenance detours may also have an impact. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on information from the Public Transport 
Ombudsman, Annual Report 2014. 
The former Transport Ticketing Authority (TTA) put in place a process for reimbursing 
affected customers, pending changes to the myki bus consoles, which it believed 
would address the issue. However, successively revised target dates to address this 
issue in 2011, 2012 and 2013 were not met. 
PTV has since taken a number of steps to address the problem. It identified that one of 
the issues was bus drivers having difficulty remembering and/or correctly entering the 
various route codes into the myki console. PTV worked with bus operators to upload 
daily shift data for each driver into the bus myki system. This meant the drivers were 
able to simply select ‘next trip’ in the console, rather than having to key in specific route 
codes. It also made the process of logging in less open to human error.  
PTV advised that when this process was trialled, occurrences of buses operating in 
‘default mode’ or logged into the incorrect route reduced significantly. PTV also 
engaged two temporary staff to expedite the uploading of shift data for metropolitan 
bus operators by March 2014. 
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Despite PTV’s efforts, PTO continues to receive complaints from consumers about 
overcharging due to Zone 1 and 2 overlap. PTV has committed to providing additional 
training and information to bus operators, to ensure that drivers understand their 
obligations and how to operate the system. In addition, it is providing regular reports to 
bus operators to indicate where drivers are not interacting with the system properly 
and may need additional training. 
Changes to fares introduced from January 2015 for travel across both Zone 1 and 
Zone 2 are expected to partly address this issue as customers will only incur a Zone 1 
fare for such trips. However, these changes will not address the problem for Zone 2 
only trips, which may continue to be overcharged. 
3.7 Benefit realisation and value for money 
The myki project has not met its original objectives as it has experienced significant 
delays, budget overruns and a substantial reduction in project scope over time. 
Figure 3I illustrates the budget increase and reduction in project scope over time. 
  Figure 3I
Summary of key myki budget and scope changes since initial project approval 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
3.7.1 Expected outcomes and benefits 
The original myki business case set out the customer, operator, and government 
objectives. These were developed following a review of prior experience of ticketing 
systems, stakeholder consultation regarding their needs, and customer research. 
Figure 3J summarises these objectives for the proposed ticketing solution. 
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   Figure 3J
Customer, operator and government objectives 
Customer Operator Government 
 Easy to understand and 
use  
 Fast and reliable 
 Easily accessible with 
convenient purchase and 
payment options 
 Ability to prepay and buy 
with cash at time of 
travel 
 Purchase and validate 
safely 
 Retention of zoned fares 
 Clear rules and 
obligations 
 Quality customer service 
 Minimum disruption 
during transition 
 Satisfies customer needs 
 Greater control over 
operation 
 Staff ability to solve 
problems on the spot 
 Fast boarding 
 Minimal fare evasion and 
concession fraud 
 Reliable usage data 
 Financial integrity 
 Flexible fare products 
 Smooth transition with 
minimum customer 
disruption 
 Well designed and 
operated, reliable and 
efficient 
 Flexibility with fares and 
ticketing 
 High quality data for 
transport planning, 
system monitoring and 
revenue allocation 
 Integration between 
metro and regional areas 
 Comply with privacy 
policy and standards 
 In place by 2007 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on A New Ticketing Solution: The Business 
Case, April 2004, Transport Ticketing Authority. 
These stakeholder objectives were then synthesised into overarching objectives to 
develop a ticketing solution that: 
 facilitates efficient, reliable and safe transport operations that encourages 
passenger growth and enhances the community image of public transport in 
Melbourne 
 provides the optimum value-for-money solution for all stakeholders and the 
lowest whole-of-life cost for the required ticketing functionality 
 supports relevant government policy objectives  
 is operational at, or shortly after, the expiry of the Metcard contract 
 provides a platform for potential future usage in other state and commercial 
applications. 
In addition to the project objectives, the business case considered the broader 
economic, social and environmental benefits of a smartcard ticketing system. These 
benefits were expected to deliver around $6.3–$10.8 million per year in benefits of 
which $4–$5 million was described as relatively tangible. From an economic 
perspective, the major expected benefits included: 
 increased attractiveness of the public transport system and therefore increased 
patronage 
 reduced fare evasion and concession fraud 
 increased ticket validations due to improved reliability 
 operating cost savings due to reduced bus boarding times. 
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3.7.2 Monitoring myki's impact 
While the business case identified all stakeholder objectives, it did not clearly 
demonstrate the link between the objectives and the contractual performance regime 
through measurable indicators. Additionally, myki's objectives have not been updated 
following modifications to its scope since it was first approved. No benefits monitoring 
and evaluation process has been established to assess whether myki has achieved its 
expected outcomes and benefits—including value for money.  
The Victorian Ombudsman's 2011 Own motion investigation into ICT-enabled projects 
recommended that an independent post-implementation review of the myki project 
against its business case objectives be undertaken to assess this. TTA and DTF 
accepted this recommendation. 
In 2012, the former Department of Transport (DOT), TTA and DTF also advised the 
Public Accounts and Estimates Committee that a review assessing the extent to which 
benefits had been realised would be undertaken following the completion of myki's 
implementation. This has yet to occur. 
The scope of the review recommended by the Ombudsman is similar to the benefits 
review recommended by DTF's Gateway Review process. This review is mandatory for 
projects assessed as High Value High Risk, such as myki. In October 2013, DTF 
sought the Treasurer's exemption from performing the benefits review required by the 
Gateway Review process on the basis that: 
 the original business case could not be accessed given it was a Cabinet 
document of the former government 
 the business case had not been updated since the project was first approved 
 a DTF led lessons learned review of the factors contributing to myki's stress 
would fulfil the state's commitment to the Ombudsman and PAEC given the 
business case could not be accessed to conduct a benefits review. 
This advice was deficient. While DTF correctly noted the constraint to accessing the 
business case posed by existing Cabinet conventions, it did not advise the Treasurer 
that this impedes: 
 the effective governance of myki, and of all major state investments requiring a 
full business case to be approved by Cabinet 
 DTF's oversight of these projects under the High Value High Risk framework. 
It also did not advise the Treasurer of the need to resolve this barrier to access given 
that the lifecycle of most major state investments extends beyond a government's term 
in office.  
This was a missed opportunity, particularly given that DTF previously raised this issue 
with the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) in 2012, and it has yet to be 
addressed. 
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Barrier to effective governance caused by Cabinet conventions 
DTF recognises that the current barrier to access caused by existing Cabinet 
conventions poses a significant challenge to the effective management of such 
projects, particularly following a change of government. In 2014 it updated its 
Investment Lifecycle Guidelines to encourage agencies to extract key information from 
full project business cases—in a form not subject to Cabinet-in-confidence 
conventions—to mitigate this issue. It also advised it has been encouraging agencies 
to develop benefit management plans to permit evaluations in the event business 
cases are not accessible.  
While these strategies will assist with mitigating the access issue, they rely on the 
vigilance of agencies to extract the relevant information prior to the business case 
being surrendered under Cabinet conventions. If this does not occur, as was the case 
with myki, the existing conventions do not enable a benefits review to be conducted. 
DTF advised that it has not yet assessed agencies' compliance with this guideline. 
DTF wrote to DPC in 2012 recommending that Cabinet conventions be amended to 
exempt full business cases for approved projects so that key information is 
permanently available to relevant agencies to support effective project implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation. DTF's letter also highlighted that this would permit central 
agencies continued access to this critical information, which they need to effectively 
carry out their roles. 
However, DTF advised that it received no response to this letter from DPC which is the 
custodian of Cabinet conventions. 
Urgent action is required to address this issue. Currently there is a risk that a business 
case is reduced to simply being a hoop agencies jump through to get the initial 
approval, which they can then disregard following a change of government. 
Rationale for exempting myki from a benefits review 
DTF's request for an exemption on the grounds that the business case had not been 
updated was also unsound. This approach risks creating an undesirable precedent that 
benefits reviews should only be reserved for projects that go according to plan, 
whereas projects that experience significant challenges and scope changes, such as 
myki, should be exempt because they have gone so far off the rails that they no longer 
reflect everything they set out to do. 
DTF and PTV asserted that a benefits review of myki against the original business 
case would be of limited value given the retender, unlike the original project, does not 
involve the development of a new system.  
However, the original myki contract established the objectives and benefits expected 
from both the initial build and ongoing operation of the system. While the retender 
focuses exclusively on myki's continued operation, a benefits review could have 
provided valuable insights on how to refine and update myki's original value 
proposition and assumed benefits, particularly in light of the changes to myki since the 
project was first approved.   
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The significant challenges experienced during myki's initial build and rollout heighten 
the need for this to occur.  
The original business case justified the state's decision to invest almost $1 billion of 
taxpayer funds to develop and implement myki on the basis that it would deliver 
significant benefits to Victorians.  
It is therefore critical for PTV and DTF to assess the benefits achieved so as to 
understand the nature and extent of any residual or new benefits that remain 
achievable going forward. It is also needed to assure full accountability and 
transparency of the achievements from this significant expenditure of taxpayer funds. 
Such a review would also provide PTV with important insights on the actions it should 
take to optimise achievement of these benefits in the current retender and next 
iteration of myki. 
Ongoing need to address the Ombudsman's 2011 
recommendation 
Any constraints in accessing the original business case could have been initially 
mitigated by TTA had it developed a benefit management plan for the project as 
recommended by a 2004 Gateway Review of the procurement strategy. This did not 
occur.  
While DTF subsequently prepared a 'lessons learned review' which identified valuable 
insights into the issues that affected myki's delivery—including the appropriateness of 
governance and contractual arrangements—the review did not assess whether any 
benefits had been achieved. Hence, it did not adequately address the Ombudsman's 
2011 recommendation and DTF's 2012 commitment to PAEC. 
Consequently, there is no evidence that myki has satisfactorily achieved any of its 
intended benefits or value for money, relative to the original business case objectives. 
However, the substantial reductions in the project's scope over time, coupled with 
significant increases in the original project time line and budget, mean that it is highly 
unlikely that the system has fully achieved any of its original objectives. 
3.7.3 Expenditure on myki 
A key determinant of value for money is the cost of myki. The total revised budget for 
myki is $1 550.5 million. This represents an increase of approximately $551.6 million, 
or 55 per cent, on the original budget of $998.9 million, and an increase of 
$809.7 million, or 109 per cent, on the business case estimate of $741.9 million. There 
have been three significant budget revisions since 2003 when the initial budget was 
developed.  
A breakdown of the original and revised budget, and actual expenditure as at 
30 June 2014 is provided in Figure 3K. 
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  Figure 3K
Original budget, revised budget and actual costs of the myki system  
as at 30 June 2014 
Category 
Original 
budget 
2003(a) 
($ million) 
Revised 
budget 
2008(a) 
($ million) 
Revised 
budget 
2012(b) 
($ million) 
Revised 
budget 
2013(c) 
($ million) 
Actual 
expenditure  
30 June 2014 
($ million) 
Capital expenditure      
Contractor payment 177.1 283.1 331.6 340.7 284.0 
Civil works 43.4 107.4 142.8 122.5 96.5 
Contingency 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 – 
Other—including capitalised 
corporate costs 
42.8 50.0 116.2 123.0 119.1 
Sub-total 283.3 460.5 610.6 606.2 499.6 
Operating expenditure      
Contractor payments 345.5 381.3 394.6 408.9 239.2 
Metcard 106.8 257.3 306.6 306.9 306.9 
TTA/PTV 230.4 252.7 206.4 228.4 164.2 
Other—contingency and risk 32.9 – – – – 
Sub-total 715.6 891.3 907.6 944.2 710.3 
Total 998.9 1 351.8 1 518.2 1 550.4 1 209.9 
(a) For the period to 2017. 
(b) For the period to 2019.  
(c) For the period to 2016. 
Source: Based on information from Public Transport Victoria and the Auditor-General's Reports on the 
Annual Financial Report of the State of Victoria, 2010–11, 2011–12 and 2013–14. 
The expenditure of the myki system includes the capital and operating costs for the 
contractor to deliver and operate myki until 2016. It also includes the cost of supporting 
the Metcard system, customer education, marketing and TTA during the initial 
transition period, as well as ongoing costs for PTV operations. 
As shown in Figure 3L the major drivers of increased costs since the original budget 
have been additional contractor payments, increased costs for civil works relating, in 
part, to installing additional myki devices, and because of the need to continue 
operating Metcard for five years longer than expected. Further, the project 
contingencies did not include the cost of negotiating an extension of the Metcard 
contract. This meant the state had little leverage to negotiate reasonable extension 
terms with the Metcard contractor. According to DTF’s 2014 Lessons learned review of 
the myki ticketing system, this resulted in significantly higher costs to keep Metcard in 
place as delays to myki occurred. 
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  Figure 3L
Comparison of original to current myki budget 
 
Source: Based on information from Public Transport Victoria and the Auditor-General's Reports 
on the Annual Financial Report of the State of Victoria, 2010–11, 2011–12 and 2013–14. 
New cost reimbursement regime 
Under the new cost reimbursement regime the state now reimburses the contractor for 
direct and indirect costs incurred in operating the myki system. This makes the 
contract more viable for the contractor, however, it exposes the state to a risk of 
increased costs. Cost driven volume parameters such as device maintenance and card 
distribution and collection activities—where the contractor previously bore the costs—
present the greatest risk to the state. 
It is not possible to assess the project's final cost. However, DTF's and PTV's financial 
analyses indicate that the myki project is expected to come in within its revised budget. 
Payments under the contract are also currently within budget. Additionally, Amending 
Deed 6 introduced the following risk mitigation measures to control costs and support 
agreed service levels: 
 more measurable and enforceable key performance indicator targets with new 
financial incentives for the contractor to outperform these—with an increased 
focus on areas of service deemed to be critical 
 a sustained poor performance regime, with abatement penalties 
 a gain-share regime, where the benefits resulting from reduced myki operating 
costs are shared with the contractor  
 establishment of the Operational Control Group which provides PTV with 
enhanced visibility of the contractor's activities through its input into key planning 
decisions. 
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Recommendations 
That Public Transport Victoria:  
1. strengthens its performance monitoring arrangements for myki prior to awarding 
the new contract by: 
 assessing the adequacy of existing performance measures and standards 
for driving improvements in performance 
 developing new measures addressing how well the equipment operates as 
distinct from the length of time for which it is available 
 reviewing on at least an annual basis and, where necessary, adjusting 
performance incentives to support further improvements in performance or 
achievement of emerging service priorities 
 developing a broader framework to assess myki's efficiency and 
effectiveness and its impact on improving performance and management of 
the public transport system 
2. uses its right under the contract to audit and verify the performance data provided 
by the contractor 
3. seek access to the original myki business case in consultation with the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet and: 
 conduct a post-implementation review of the myki project against its original 
objectives and benefits 
 incorporate relevant lessons into the new myki contract as soon as possible 
and in any future subsequent procurement of public transport ticketing 
services. 
That the Department of Treasury and Finance coordinate with the Department of 
Premier and Cabinet to: 
4. advise the government on the impacts of current Cabinet conventions on the 
Gateway Review and High Value High Risk framework and related benefits 
reviews. 
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4  Ticketing services retender 
At a glance 
Background  
The current myki contract expires in June 2016 with an option to extend it for a further 
six months at the state's discretion. Public Transport Victoria (PTV) has commenced 
planning the myki retender to ensure the system continues to operate beyond the 
current contract. Effective procurement planning is important to ensure that previous 
issues impacting on myki's implementation and performance do not recur.  
Conclusion 
The myki retender is occurring under significant time pressure and with no contingency 
in the schedule, which means the retender may well be resolved after the current 
contract expires. This would expose the state to significant additional costs and repeat 
the mistakes of the past. 
Delays in planning and commencing the retender process have forced PTV to exercise 
its option to extend the current contract for a further six months to accommodate the 
tender evaluation and transition period. 
Findings 
• PTV has adopted a high-risk procurement strategy as the retender is being 
implemented under significant time pressure.  
• Probity procedures established by PTV largely conform to Victorian Government 
Purchasing Board guidelines.  
• The myki retender has a clearly defined and focused governance structure. 
• PTV has considered relevant lessons from myki's past in the planning of its 
retender. 
Recommendation 
That PTV clarifies the benefits and intended outcomes sought by the retender and 
develops associated measurable indicators. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The current myki contract expires in June 2016 with an option to extend it for a further 
six months at the state's discretion. 
Public Transport Victoria (PTV) has commenced planning the myki retender, known as 
the Ticketing Services Retender (TSR), to ensure myki continues to operate beyond 
the current contract. 
The scale, complexity and significance of myki to the state means the retender is a 
High Value High Risk project that will be subject to oversight by the Treasurer and the 
Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF).  
This Part assesses whether the planning for the retender is soundly based and 
designed to deliver a value-for-money outcome. It specifically examines:  
 the adequacy of procurement planning  
 whether appropriate governance arrangements have been established for the 
tender  
 whether lessons learned from the myki contract have been considered. 
As the retender is at an early stage, we have examined the procurement planning 
undertaken at the time of the audit. 
4.2 Conclusion 
The myki retender is occurring under significant time pressure due in part to previous 
delays in implementing myki. 
The virtual absence of any contingency in the retender schedule means the tender 
outcome may well be resolved after the current contractual term expires. If this occurs, 
it risks exposing the state to significant additional costs. 
PTV is taking steps to mitigate the risk of this occurring and is leveraging the lessons, 
where relevant, from the previous myki contract. PTV's effective implementation of 
related initiatives will be critical to achieving this.  
The expected outcomes and benefits from the retender process have not been clearly 
defined. PTV needs to address this issue as it reduces the transparency of the new 
contract's impact, and accountability for PTV's related performance. 
4.3 Procurement planning 
The Victorian Government Purchasing Board (VGPB) sets policies and minimum 
standards for departments’ procurement of non-construction goods and services. 
VGPB has recently moved to more principles-based policies under the procurement 
reform process, and PTV has committed to meeting these standards. 
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VGPB guidance indicates that sound procurement planning involves: 
 developing a business case which establishes the need for the goods and/or 
services to be procured and identifies options for acquiring them, and the risks, 
costs and benefits associated with each option  
 developing a procurement conduct plan and related strategy for 
implementing the preferred option—for example, a single or multi-stage tender 
 establishing a sound probity framework to achieve an impartial, transparent 
and accountable tender process 
 developing a risk management strategy detailing the mitigation strategies for 
managing significant risks to the procurement.  
4.3.1 Developing a business case 
PTV has not developed a business case for the TSR project. Instead it determined, 
with agreement from DTF, that the key elements of a business case would be 
incorporated in a detailed procurement strategy. This is because the retender is for an 
existing service whose need has previously been established, and does not require 
new infrastructure. This approach was reasonable. 
4.3.2 Developing a procurement strategy 
As a High Value High Risk project, the TSR procurement strategy was subject to a 
Gateway Review in August 2014. The review noted that the strategy was lacking in key 
areas. In particular, it highlighted that the identified critical success factors and benefits 
needed to be more specific and measurable. 
PTV subsequently refined its strategy in an effort to address these issues, however, it 
still fails to adequately address these key business case requirements. In particular, 
identified benefits remain vague, and the associated measures are indicators of 
outputs rather than of outcomes or benefits. Consequently, the proposed measures are 
not sufficient for assessing the outcomes from the retender process, including 
implementation of the resulting contract. 
Project time lines 
PTV has adopted a high-risk procurement strategy as the retender is being 
implemented under significant time pressure. 
Delays in planning and commencing the retender process have forced PTV to exercise 
its option to extend the current contract for a further six months in order to 
accommodate the tender evaluation and transition period. This has virtually eliminated 
any contingency in the retender schedule. 
The current procurement schedule is set out in Figure 4A. The transition period from 
the current contractor to new contractor is planned to occur from July 2016 to 
November 2016 which leaves only one month—December 2016—as a contingency. 
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  Figure 4A
Ticketing service retender project time line 
Milestone Proposed date 
Procurement Strategy approved October 2014 
Expression of interest (EOI) released February 2015 
EOI closed April 2015 
EOI evaluation completed May 2015 
Request for tender (RFT) released August 2015 
RFT closed October 2015 
RFT evaluations completed January 2016 
Negotiations completed March 2016 
Contract award and execution March–June 2016 
Expiry of current myki contract June 2016 
Transition phase July–November 2016 
Transition period end November 2016 
Expiry of current myki contract if extension option exercised December 2016 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on Public Transport Victoria's Ticketing Services 
Retender Procurement Strategy. 
PTV's procurement strategy acknowledges that the time line is challenging but 
considers it is achievable provided scope expectations are effectively managed. DTF's 
2014 Gateway Review similarly found that the current schedule is tight and a number 
of activities ‘appear to be behind schedule or are yet to be resourced’. 
The limited contingency means there are significant risks in meeting the transition time 
line. PTV's procurement strategy acknowledges this issue largely affects the latter 
stages of the procurement—in particular the RFT response and evaluation phase, and 
contract negotiation and award—as there is little scope in the schedule to respond to 
emerging issues. 
It is evident that PTV is actively monitoring the project time lines and has met its first 
two major milestones with the approval of the procurement strategy in October 2014, 
and the release of the EOI in February 2015. 
Any slippage in the current schedule, however, risks incurring significant additional 
costs for the state as the current contract provides no option for further extensions. 
This means there is no certainty that this can feasibly occur. Any further extension of 
the transition and handover period beyond December 2016, if a new contractor is 
appointed, is likely to require extensive negotiations with the incumbent operator and 
significant additional funds to cover unanticipated costs.  
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4.3.3 Management of risks 
PTV has prepared a Contract Strategy Framework with transition options including fall 
back options in the event that procurement time lines are extended beyond the current 
contract. These options if activated will result in substantial costs for the state if a new 
contractor is appointed and PTV cannot negotiate a satisfactory transition with the 
incumbent provider.  
PTV advised that the TSR project risks and issues are managed in line with its Risk 
Management Framework, which is based on the Victorian Government’s Risk 
Management Framework 2011 and consistent with AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 Risk 
Management – Principles and Guidelines. 
We observed that risks, including those impacting time lines, have been tabled with the 
TSR Steering Committee at every meeting. However, it will be critical for them to be 
effectively managed going forward in order to mitigate the risk of any future slippage in 
the tender schedule.  
4.3.4 Probity 
PTV has established probity procedures that largely conform to the guidelines set out 
in VGPB's policy for the Conduct of Commercial Engagements. This policy requires: 
 accountability and transparency of the procurement process 
 fairness and impartiality in carrying out the procurement 
 management of actual, potential and perceived conflicts of interest 
 maintaining the confidentiality and security of tender documentation and 
information 
 attaining value for money. 
Specifically, PTV developed a procurement conduct plan which reinforces these 
standards of conduct, and establishes clear processes for identifying and managing 
conflicts of interest. 
PTV also engaged a probity auditor to independently assess and report on the conduct 
of the procurement process. However, the probity auditor also provided advice on the 
development of the procurement conduct plan.  
Although VGPB policy and associated guidelines allow both the probity auditor and 
probity advisor roles to reside with a single entity, VAGO considers combining these 
roles at the very least, weakens the perception of independence. 
PTV has subsequently appointed a separate probity advisor for the remainder of the 
procurement process, which is in line with better practice. 
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4.4 Governance arrangements  
Project governance should set a firm framework to guide project success, create 
transparency and confidence in decision-making, and provide clarity around roles and 
responsibilities.  
The TSR project has a well-defined governance structure. PTV has clearly 
documented the roles and responsibilities of key groups and individuals working on the 
project.  
Figure 4B outlines the governance structure for the TSR project. 
  Figure 4B
Project governance structure 
Name Description 
PTV board The board is responsible for providing the TSR project with 
strategic direction, ensuring that it is aligned with PTV's objectives, 
and endorsing recommendations of the TSR Steering Committee. 
Ticketing Advisory 
Group (TAG) 
 
Chaired by PTV and made up of senior management staff from 
PTV, the Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport 
& Resources (DEDJTR), DTF and the Department of Premier and 
Cabinet (DPC). 
The TAG oversees the retender and provides advice to PTV’s 
management and board on the management of the myki retender. 
TSR Steering 
Committee 
Chaired by PTV’s chief executive officer and executive sponsor 
and consists of senior management from PTV, DTF, DPC and 
DEDJTR and an independent subject matter expert. 
The committee is unique to the TSR project and is responsible for 
ensuring the project aligns with government policies, providing 
recommendations to the PTV board, and monitoring the project—
including emerging risks. 
Project sponsor A senior PTV executive who is the key interface between the 
steering committee and project stakeholders including the 
government, PTV board, DTF, DEDJTR, DPC and public transport 
operators.  
Project manager A PTV manager who is accountable to PTV’s steering committee 
and chief executive officer, for delivery of the project—including, 
reporting on progress, stakeholder management and 
communications, managing budget and scope, managing project 
activities and resources. 
Project team Prepares project documentation, including draft EOI/RFT, provides 
supporting analysis and recommendations to evaluation 
teams/panel and the project steering committee. 
Subject matter 
experts 
Subject matter experts within PTV and private industry are used 
where necessary to review documentation and offer relevant 
advice specific to their area of proficiency.  
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on information from Public Transport Victoria. 
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4.5 Lessons learned 
The previous reviews of myki outlined in Part 2 of this report identify a range of issues 
that impacted the delivery of myki, particularly in the early project procurement phase. 
The difficult history of public transport ticketing procurement in Victoria reinforces the 
need for the TSR project to consider the lessons from these previous procurements.  
While many aspects of the issues highlighted in Part 2 relate to a project with a 
significant build component, it is evident that PTV has considered many of the relevant 
lessons to date. 
Figure 4C outlines the strategies PTV advised it is implementing to avoid a 
reoccurrence of previous issues. 
  Figure 4C
PTV's consideration of lessons learned 
Previous issues impacting on the delivery 
of myki 
PTV strategies to mitigate issues similar to 
identified 
Governance structure not well defined  
Previous DTF reviews identified that the 
original myki governance structure was not 
clearly defined—particularly the roles and 
responsibilities of key agencies. 
This made it difficult to identify which 
agencies were responsible for different 
aspects of the project and resulted in 
ineffective communication and engagement 
between key agencies. 
As noted in Part 2 of this report, myki's 
governance arrangements were revised 
following PTV's establishment in 2012. The new 
arrangements have resolved the previous 
disconnect in responsibilities for public transport 
ticketing policy development and implementation 
that hampered the former Transport Ticketing 
Authority's (TTA) management of myki.  
Project leadership lacked requisite expertise 
The Ombudsman's 2011 inquiry into the 
management of ICT-enabled projects 
questioned whether the TTA board had the 
requisite skills to manage an ICT project like 
myki. Without the any relevant experience it 
would be difficult for a board member to 
question details of the project. 
The TAG, which has oversight of the retender, 
consists of senior representatives from PTV, 
DEDJTR, DPC and DTF with relevant ICT 
expertise and experience. 
Chaired by PTV’s chief executive officer and 
executive sponsor and consists of senior 
management from PTV, DEDJTR, DPC and 
DTF, and an independent subject matter expert. 
To assist with the more technical aspects of the 
retender, PTV has appointed: 
 a contractor with significant ICT contracts 
and contract renegotiations experience 
 a number of external advisors to complement 
and supplement PTV's capability and 
resources.  
  
Ticketing services retender 
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Figure 4C  
PTV's consideration of lessons learned – continued 
Previous issues impacting on the delivery 
of myki 
PTV strategies to mitigate issues similar 
identified 
Contract did not adequately specify functional performance requirements 
The DTF review found that the original 
contract was large and complex and 
outcomes-based. This meant that the 
functional performance requirements of the 
system were not clearly defined. 
Consequently this resulted in 
misunderstanding of the requirements of the 
contractor and contributed to the delays and 
budget increases. 
 
Successive amendments to the original myki 
contract, incorporating the new performance 
regime have now better clarified the system's 
functional performance requirements. PTV 
does not expect this issue to re-emerge in the 
retender as, unlike the previous myki contract, 
it does not involve a significant ICT build 
component. 
PTV advised it has engaged a contractor 
experienced in developing performance 
regimes for service contracts that will consider 
this issue. 
Time frame for project planning was insufficient  
The DTF review found that the initial delivery 
time frame for myki was not developed 
rigorously from the ground up but driven by a 
predetermined deadline—the expiration of 
the Metcard contract. This resulted in 
unrealistic delivery times and budgets, a 
poorly developed specification and 
inadequate consideration of project risks 
 
PTV commenced planning for the retender in 
2013 following completion of the V/Line 
rollout—the last phase of the myki 
implementation.  
PTV is managing the time line risk through the 
TSR Steering Committee which is closely 
monitoring the project and emerging risks to 
assure timely action is taken to mitigate the 
impact of emerging issues. 
Potential lessons from international benchmarking were not incorporated into project 
planning 
The DTF review found that the myki contract 
was not appropriately benchmarked against 
similar projects around the world, in 
complexity, size, budget and time. This would 
have highlighted that no other jurisdiction in 
the world had developed and delivered a 
ticketing system with an outcome-based 
specification through an open architecture 
approach in the two-year time frame 
committed.  
PTV advised that it maintains close contact 
with the Ticketing Authority Partnership, a 
national body that draws on experiences, 
including lessons learned, from other 
jurisdictions.  
In addition, senior PTV executives have met 
with, and held confidential discussions with, 
other relevant jurisdictions to gain assurance 
about the feasibility of the tender schedule. 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on information from Public Transport Victoria. 
Recommendation 
5. That Public Transport Victoria clarifies the retender benefits and intended 
outcomes and develops measurable associated indicators. 
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Appendix A. 
 Regional myki use 
myki on the regional train and coach network 
myki is in use on selected V/Line commuter train lines to and from Melbourne. 
Figure A1 shows the extent of myki use on the regional rail and coach network with 
myki use highlighted in purple. 
  Figure A1
Regional train and coach network 
 
Source:  V/Line Regional train and coach network map. 
Appendix A. Regional myki use 
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myki on the regional town bus network 
myki is in use on buses in multiple regional towns. Figure A2 shows which town bus 
networks are included in the myki ticketing system.  
  Figure A2
Regional towns included in myki 
Regional towns   
Bacchus Marsh Geelong Traralgon 
Ballarat Kilmore Wallan 
Bellarine Moe Warragul 
Bendigo Morwell  
Churchill Seymour  
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on information from Public Transport Victoria. 
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Appendix B. 
Audit Act 1994 section 16—
submissions and comments 
 
Introduction 
In accordance with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994, a copy of this report was 
provided to the Public Transport Victoria, the Department of Treasury and Finance, and 
the Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport & Resources. 
The submissions and comments provided are not subject to audit nor the evidentiary 
standards required to reach an audit conclusion. Responsibility for the accuracy, 
fairness and balance of those comments rests solely with the agency head. 
Responses were received as follows: 
Public Transport Victoria ............................................................................................. 56 
Department of Treasury and Finance .......................................................................... 59 
Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport & Resources ...................... 61 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Public Transport Victoria 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Public Transport Victoria –
continued  
Appendix B. Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Public Transport Victoria –
continued  
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Treasury and Finance 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Treasury and Finance – 
continued  
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Economic Development, 
Jobs, Transport & Resources  
 

Auditor-General’s reports 
Reports tabled during 2014–15 
 
Report title Date tabled
Technical and Further Education Institutes: Results of the 2013 Audits (2014–15:1) August 2014 
Coordinating Public Transport (2014–15:2) August 2014 
Managing the Environmental Impacts of Transport (2014–15:3) August 2014 
Access to Legal Aid (2014–15:4) August 2014 
Managing Landfills (2014–15:5) September 2014 
Management and Oversight of the Caulfield Racecourse Reserve (2014–15:6) September 2014 
Effectiveness of Catchment Management Authorities (2014–15:7) September 2014 
Heatwave Management: Reducing the Risk to Public Health (2014–15:8) October 2014 
Emergency Response ICT Systems (2014–15:9) October 2014 
Public Sector Performance Measurement and Reporting (2014–15:10) October 2014 
Mental Health Strategies for the Justice System (2014–15:11) October 2014 
Information and Communications Technology Controls Report 2013–14 (2014–15:12) October 2014 
Auditor-General's Report on the Annual Financial Report of the State of Victoria, 
2013–14 (2014–15:13) 
October 2014 
Additional School Costs for Families (2014–15:14) February 2015 
Responses to 2012–13 Performance Audit Recommendations (2014–15:15) February 2015 
Water Entities: Results of the 2013–14 Audits (2014–15:16) February 2015 
Portfolio Departments and Associated Entities: Results of the 2013–14 Audits 
(2014–15:17) 
February 2015 
Public Hospitals: Results of the 2013–14 Audits (2014–15:18) February 2015 
Efficiency and Effectiveness of Hospital Services: High-value Equipment 
(2014–15:19) 
February 2015 
Effectiveness of Support for Local Government (2014–15:20) February 2015 
Local Government: Results of the 2013–14 Audits (2014–15:21) February 2015 
Managing Regulator Performance (2014–15:22) March 2015 
Education Transitions (2014–15:23) March 2015 
Emergency Service Response Times (2014–15:24)  March 2015 
  
Report title Date tabled
Digital Dashboard: Status Review of ICT Projects and Initiatives (2014–15:25) April 2015 
Palliative Care (2014–15:26) April 2015 
Tendering of Metropolitan Bus Contracts (2014–15:27) May 2015 
Occupational Violence Against Healthcare Workers (2014–15:28) May 2015 
Early Intervention Services for Vulnerable Children and Families (2014–15:29)  May 2015 
Universities: 2014 Audit Snapshot (2014–15:30) May 2015 
Technical and Further Education Institutes: 2014 Audit Snapshot (2014–15:31) May 2015 
Victoria’s Consumer Protection Framework for Building Construction (2014–15:32) May 2015 
VAGO’s website at www.audit.vic.gov.au contains a comprehensive list of all reports issued by VAGO.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Availability of reports 
All reports are available for download in PDF and HTML format on our website 
www.audit.vic.gov.au 
 
Or contact us at: 
Victorian Auditor-General's Office 
Level 24, 35 Collins Street 
Melbourne Vic. 3000 
AUSTRALIA 
Phone: +61 3 8601 7000 
Fax: +61 3 8601 7010 
Email: comments@audit.vic.gov.au 
 
